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THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS: A MODEL FOR GREECE AND TURKEY

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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES C. RANSICK, MAJ, USA
B.A., Arkansas Tech University, 1977

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THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS: A MODEL FOR GREECE AND TURKEY, by Major James C. Ransick, USA, 169 pages.

This study examines the ongoing Greece-Turkey conflict and the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords in an effort to determine whether or not the successful 1978 approach can be modified and adapted to bring peace to Greece and Turkey. The focus throughout the thesis is on the military perspective.

The methodology used to develop the study is a historical, descriptive, comparison approach. The analysis begins with a historical review of all the issues that form the current Greek-Turkish dispute. This is followed by an examination of the importance of these two NATO allies to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Included in this discussion is a detailed look at the Soviet Union's regional interests and the methods the Soviets currently use to expand their influence in the region. Balancing the Soviet perspective is a review of United States' relations with Greece and Turkey, which also includes addressing United States regional interests.

The final block of the historical analysis is a review and study of the domestic and international situations that led Egypt and Israel to sign the Camp David Accords. The conclusion of the historical study contains an examination of the Camp David negotiating process and the Accords themselves.

The subsequent descriptive comparison and integration of the Camp David model with the Greece-Turkey conflict divides the hostile issues into three categories (security, territorial and economic) and then compares the two cases to determine their likeness. After running this comparison, the study concludes that the Greek-Turkish dispute is analogous to the situation that faced Egypt and Israel prior to the Camp David Summit. It further concludes that the Camp David approach will work in the Aegean if properly adapted to the situation. *Keywords* →

The final analysis indicates that the United States cannot afford for the ongoing dispute to continue unabated. The summer of 1989 will offer the optimum time frame for President Bush to initiate a Camp David peace approach in the Aegean, primarily because of the domestic political situations in Greece, Turkey, and the United States.

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

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This study examines the ongoing Greece-Turkey conflict and the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords in an effort to determine whether or not the successful 1978 approach can be modified and adapted to bring peace to Greece and Turkey. The focus throughout the thesis is on the military perspective.

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CHAPTER 1

THE CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

Today the volatile state of affairs in the Persian Gulf and Middle East is a reminder of the importance of maintaining a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), southern flank. However, a centuries old dispute between two NATO allies threatens the sturdiness of the Alliance in this region. The ongoing conflict between Greece and Turkey is weakening NATO and endangering the future cohesiveness of the Alliance. The latest major incident took place in March 1987 when a dispute over mineral exploration rights in the Aegean Sea's continental shelf almost brought the two countries to armed conflict. Both countries mobilized their military forces for possible war, and it was only because of an international appeal for restraint and the intervention by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu of Greece and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of Turkey that armed confrontation was averted.¹

Other major areas involved in the dispute include:

1. The current forced division of the island of Cyprus into two governments as a result of the 1974 invasion

¹James Brown, "The Politics of Transition in Turkey," Current History, (February 1988), p. 71.

by Turkey. In the north, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus is recognized as a legitimate government only by its principle supporter, Turkey. In the south exists a Greek Cypriot government and community, recognized as the legitimate government of Cyprus by the United States and the international community (except Turkey).

2. The recognized territorial sea limits of both countries in the Aegean and Mediterranean.

3. The established air-traffic-control system that monitors over the airspace above the Aegean Sea.

4. The Greek militarization of several strategically located Greek islands in the Aegean, that are in close proximity to Turkey's Aegean coastline and the Turkish straits.

5. The issue of an integrated Greece-Turkey-NATO military command, control and planning system for both air and land forces.

This new conflict is also interfering with the United States' ability to project its presence and influence into the region.

According to Admiral William Rowden, Commander of the US Sixth Fleet from 1981 to 1983, control of the Mediterranean in time of war is crucial. Over 60 percent of Soviet exports and 50 percent of its imports go through the Bosphorus, and an average of 150 Soviet merchant ships ride the Mediterranean at any one time. The Mediterranean is also crucial to the economies of the West, which are fueled by the 300 to 400 oil tankers that cross

its waters with 25 million barrels of oil on any given day.²

Specifically, Greece and Turkey can deny the Soviet Navy the ability to project its military sea power from the Black Sea into the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas by controlling the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles at the mouth of the Black Sea and through the militarization of the Aegean shoreline and key Aegean islands. In March 1984, Assistant Secretary of Defense for the International Security Policy, Richard Perle testified to the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs:

...that if the United States is unable to keep the Soviet Union's massive maritime capability bottled up in the Black Sea, the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean in a conventional war could and almost certainly would shift against the United States and its allies, with catastrophic consequences for us and for friends in the region, including Israel and the moderate Arab states.³

These independent comments from two senior United States officials, one military and one civilian, demonstrate the importance that the United States Department of Defense places on NATO's southern flank, specifically Greece and Turkey. What must now be determined in this study is whether or not these two countries are critical to the United States'

²Constantine Melakopides, "Socialism With a Greek Face," International Perspectives (Canada), (July/August 1985), p. 145.

³Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance," Foreign Policy, (Spring 1985), p. 117.

attainment of its national goals. If they are, how do we bring about a lasting peace between Greece and Turkey that will favorably impact on the United States?

I became interested in the Greece-Turkey conflict and the Cyprus dispute after my assignment to Egypt in 1983. Working in the American Embassy in the Office of Military Cooperation with the foreign military sales program, showed me how the Camp David Peace Accords had brought peace to Egypt and Israel. Being of Greek heritage and having a Bachelor of Arts degree in History and Political Science, the ongoing dispute and its effects on NATO and the United States attracted my attention. The idea of using the Camp David Peace Accords as a model for formulating a peace plan for Greece and Turkey seemed a logical conclusion for what seems to be two similar situations: two nations of strategic importance to the United States, involved in hostile conflict.

The Camp David Peace Accords formed the first step toward peace for Egypt and Israel and may provide a working model for developing a peace plan for Greece and Turkey. The Camp David Peace Accords themselves were little more than an agreed framework from which the two countries could develop a more detailed and lasting peace treaty. The Camp David Peace Accords addressed the reduction of troop strengths and provided recommendations for future meetings and agreements to resolve the remaining issues. The Accords also listed

specific areas that were to be included in the final peace treaty.

A study of the Camp David Peace Accords reveals a situation existed between Egypt and Israel analogous to that between Greece and Turkey today. The first similarity is the basic desire by both Greece and Turkey to have peace. This desire is motivated by: fear of possible armed conflict; threat of continued or worsening poor economic conditions; a general desire for peace between the two countries; and finally, world pressure for harmony in the region.

The second similarity is the current United Nations involvement. United Nations peacekeeping forces continue to patrol Cyprus (since 1964), while the United Nations Security Council remains active in deliberations and resolutions. Third, the United States is currently providing both military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, aid which could be used by the United States to influence a peace initiative. The fourth similarity is the negative economic impact the disputed issues are having on the economies of the two countries. Finally, as in 1979 with Egypt and Israel, today's conflict centers around several geographical, political, economic, and security related issues.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the United States can formulate a successful peace plan

to resolve the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey. The study will examine the areas currently in dispute between the two countries and will analyze the regional importance they both play as the foundation for NATO's southern flank and as allies to the United States. Next, the study will analyze the Camp David Peace Accords that brought peace to Egypt and Israel. The intent of this inspection is to determine the possibility of using its framework again, this time in the eastern Mediterranean to bring an end to the Greece-Turkey dispute.

Questions that will assist in the development of the thesis are:

1. What is the cause of the dispute?
2. Are Greece and Turkey regionally important to the United States?
3. What impact do the actions of the Soviet Union have on the situation? What influence does the Soviet Union have in the region?
4. What was the framework in the Camp David Peace Accords? Why was it successful?
5. What price did/does the United States pay for peace between Egypt and Israel?
6. Who should the primary peace mediator be? The United States? NATO? The U.N.?
7. Can the Camp David Peace Accords be utilized to form a solution to the Greece-Turkey dispute? If a modified

framework achieves peace, what will the projected gains be? If it fails, what will the cost be?

The conclusion of this study will be the determination of whether or not the United States can reconfigure the Accords to achieve peace between Greece and Turkey. An additional benefit of the study will be the compilation and centralization of the factors that make these two countries of increasing importance to the United States and NATO.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

As noted previously, both Greece and Turkey continue to grow in importance to the United States and NATO. An example of their growing importance is their ability to control and monitor Soviet naval access from the Black Sea into the Aegean Sea, and more importantly the Eastern Mediterranean, an area that the United States Navy transits extensively enroute to the Persian Gulf. Also of importance is that these countries provide the Alliance with critical ground-based air defense early warning information: NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) sites. Nine NADGE sites are located in Greece and sixteen in Turkey.⁴ Both countries also provide facilities for the forward deployment

⁴Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: United States Policy Options Toward Greece and Turkey," SAIS Review, (Winter/Spring 1986), p. 146.

of United States and NATO NE-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.

The ongoing dispute continues to weaken this critical flank of NATO. The significance of this study is to provide the military and political communities with a complete discussion of this "no win" situation between two of our NATO allies. As a minimum, the reader will have an understanding of the background issues, will learn the importance of the region to both the United States and NATO, and will acquire an overview of what the current situation and future outlook offers.

THESIS PROBLEM STATEMENT

The thesis title, "The Camp David Peace Accords; a Model for Greece and Turkey," sets the stage for this study's analysis of the conflict between Greece and Turkey in an effort to determine if the framework of the Camp David Peace Accords can be copied and used to bring peace to these two allies.

The thesis problem statement formulated for this study is: Can the United States develop a peace plan for the ongoing Greece-Turkey conflict using the Camp David Peace Accords as a model?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The history of conflict and poor relations between Greece and Turkey predates the current issues that form the areas of dispute. To keep this study current and relevant to today's military and political communities, the analysis will initially focus on the time period surrounding the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July/August 1974 and extend through present-day developments.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research method used to complete this analysis is a historical, descriptive comparison. Although a complete study of the problem and its solution would be incomplete without addressing economic and trade issues, this study will only introduce them when pertinent to developing the military perspective. The study's primary sources of information include historical United States government reports, international political science and intelligence study group findings, and books authored by the two key participants and neutral students of the region. Because this thesis subject is active in today's world affairs, the study will include recent United States, Greek and Turkish government reports, international intelligence and political studies, and various articles to keep its findings accurate and timely. Interviews with Turkish officers assigned to the Army Command and General Staff College and American officers that have

served in Greece and Turkey will also be integrated into this study.

The study itself addresses the thesis problem statement in a logical sequence. The first step will be to conduct an analysis of the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey. Historical and present-day information on the key issues causing the conflict will be examined. The issue analysis will be followed by a review of why these two countries are important to the United States and NATO. The review will focus on the geographical pre-eminence of both countries in the region and their contribution to the NATO Alliance.

With an understanding of what the problem is and why it is crucial for the United States to resolve the conflict, the study will examine the Camp David Peace Accords. The discussion will identify: why the peace plan was necessary for Egypt and Israel, how the Accords were designed, how they were implemented successfully, and the cost to the United States for bringing peace to these two countries. With the analysis of the peace plan model complete, a comparison of the two situations (Egypt/Israel to Greece/Turkey) will be drawn in an effort to determine whether or not the Camp David Peace Accords can be molded to achieve a prevailing peace between Greece and Turkey. This historical, descriptive comparison will provide an answer to the basic thesis problem statement: "Can the United States develop a peace plan for

the ongoing Greek-Turkish conflict using the Camp David Peace Accords as a model?" The study will conclude with recommendations for possible further research and a summary of the future outlook for the ongoing dispute.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Subsequent chapters will detail and analyze the following:

Chapter 2 - This chapter will initially review the fundamental differences that influence the current Greek-Turkish dispute. With an understanding of the basic differences complete, the chapter will proceed with a discussion of the areas specifically disputed to include:

- Aegean Sea continental shelf rights.
- Invasion and division of Cyprus.
- Aegean territorial water limits.
- Aegean air-traffic-control.
- Militarization of Greek Islands.
- NATO command and control structure.

Chapter 3 - Today, more than ever, it is critical to the NATO Alliance for its southern members to form a strong southern flank. This chapter analyzes the important regional roles that Greece and Turkey play. After a brief study of the geographical pre-eminence of these two countries and their influence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea region, the study addresses the power that the Soviet Union maintains in

this region. With a detailed understanding of why this is a geographically important area and what role the Soviet Union plays there, the study addresses how these facts affect the vulnerability of NATO's southern flank. The conclusion of this chapter includes an analysis of Greece and Turkey's past and current relationships with the United States.

Chapter 4 - This chapter studies the framework and background of the Camp David Peace Accords that brought peace to Egypt and Israel. The need for peace is addressed first, followed by a study of the treaty's design and framework. This chapter concludes with a review of what the cost of peace between Egypt and Israel has been to the United States in terms of aid provided to both countries.

Chapter 5 - The final chapter integrates the researched framework from the Camp David Peace Accords with the hostile situation in Greece and Turkey. A subsequent review of past and present mediation efforts is followed by a discussion of why the United States should lead the negotiations as the peace mediator. This analysis addresses the cost of peace to the United States in terms of:

- Projected gains.
- Cost of failure.
- Implications.

The conclusion of this chapter provides a final recommendation of whether or not the proposed thesis question will work (Can the United States develop a peace plan for the

ongoing Greece-Turkey conflict using the Camp David Peace
Accords as a model?).

CHAPTER 2

AREAS OF DISPUTE

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES

History and current activities prove that hatred and distrust continue to run between these two geographically important countries. The current dispute finds its origins in several fundamental differences that separate the two. A study of this century alone provides a list of events and historically important facts that delineate these fundamental differences. The following two paragraphs establish in chronological sequence these important points.

Historically, Turkey has been a Muslim nation and remains so today with the majority of its population belonging to one of several Muslim sects. Because of its Muslim ties and geographic proximity to the Middle East, Turkey is considered a "border" nation, not a European state and not an Arab country. Although Turkey would like to be considered European, several other in-country situations inhibit that status. First, the country's ethnic population with its historical origins combine to create an economically underdeveloped, rural, farming society. Within the country's economy, the contribution to the nation GDP by industry (26%) and agriculture (21%) is almost evenly split. Services

account for an additional 47% of the 1987 GDP.¹ In the political arena, Turkey is a new republic since November 1983, struggling with its rebirth of democracy. Prior to the 1983 election of Turgot Ozal, Turkey had experimented unsuccessfully with a democratic form of government and was governed by military rule. The primary foreign policy issue that this new democracy wrestles with is the prevention of Soviet expansionism at the expense of Turkey. Turkey has been pro-American since the March 1947 Truman Doctrine provided critical aid and support to Turkey to assist its efforts to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, Turkey remains pro-American and pro-NATO in spite of actions such as the United States arms embargo of 1974.

Unlike Turkey, Greece is considered an Orthodox Christian nation with solid ties to a European heritage. One could even say that the history of Greece is the history of the European civilization. Although much of Greece is rural, its economy is diversified and does not rely heavily on its agricultural output. Within the economy, services (31%), manufacturing (17.6%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (15.8%), and trade (15.4%), made up the majority of the contributions to Greece's 1987 GDP.²

¹Country Report: Turkey, 1988-1989 (May 1988), pp. 88-89.

²Country Report: Greece, 1988-1989 (June 1988), pp. 15-16.

Greece is a current member of the European Community (EC) which strengthens its ties to Europe. Politically, Greece is a parliamentary democracy with a socialist political party in power. Greece also maintains ties with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Although Greece is a member of NATO, its head of state, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, espouses an anti-American and anti-NATO philosophy, and allows its foreign policy to be dominated by Greece's dispute with Turkey.

Today's conflict between these two very different cultures is not based on these historical differences. These differences, while they add fuel to the fire, are not the center of the conflict. The current clash stems from the two nations' dispute over several key contemporary international issues.

AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF RIGHTS

The first contemporary quarrel that surfaced was over the ownership of the oil and mineral rights to the Aegean Sea continental shelf (hereafter referred to as continental shelf). The Greek discovery of oil (in 1973) in the Northern Aegean off the island of Thasos, started a race between Greece and Turkey for Aegean oil drilling and exploration. Up to this time, Greece had only established a moderate search effort and had granted several mineral exploration licenses to foreign companies. With the discovery of oil,

competition for continental shelf mineral rights became fierce.

Because the discovery of oil off Thasos promised the possibility of large oil deposits in the Aegean, Turkey wasted no time in awarding its own mineral exploration licenses on November 1, 1973. The dispute originated over the issue of the locations for which Turkey granted exploration rights. The locations granted to the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO) overlapped what had been claimed previously as continental shelf belonging to Greece. This line of exploration in the Northwest Aegean extends west of the Greek Islands of (listed north to south) Samothrace, Lemnos, Aghios Efstratios, Lesbos, Psara and Chios. Greece immediately protested, citing the "Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf" as its basis for claiming the disputed continental shelf areas. The key premise that Greece cited in the wording of the Convention was

--Continental shelf shall refer (a) to the seabed adjacent to the coast but outside territorial seas to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond to a depth where exploration is technically feasible and (b) to a similar submarine area adjacent to the coasts of islands.

--The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the waters above the high seas, or the airspace above those waters.³

³Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," Adelphi Papers, (Winter 1979/1980), p. 4.

The problem that faced Greece in using the Geneva Convention as its basis for a claim of ownership, was that Turkey protested that it was not bound by the law because it had not signed the Convention. The counter argument posed by Greece however, that islands have their own continental shelves "has been embodied in the Geneva Convention as a codification of customary law binding on all countries, irrespective of whether they have or have not signed the Convention."⁴

Turkey pressed forward in its exploration efforts despite the efforts of Greece; and on May 29, 1973, a Turkish survey ship, "accompanied by 32 warships of the Turkish Navy, spent six days exploring and sailing along the western limit of the areas...."⁵ The situation worsened one month later in July. Turkey enlarged the exploration area to "compass all of the Greek Dodecanese Islands southward, and extended the research area even further west in the Aegean.

It was at this point that the importance of the continental shelf issue was overtaken by the July 20, 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus (discussion in next section). No real action was taken on this issue again until 1975. Detailed discussion of the mediation efforts made since 1975 are included in Chapter Five.

⁴Jonathan Alford, ed., Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 134.

⁵Wilson, p. 6.

CYPRUS, THE CRITICAL ISSUE

The current dispute over Cyprus forms the heart of the current Greece-Turkey dispute. Cyprus is situated in a strategic location only 40 miles south of Turkey, 60 miles west of Syria, 150 miles west of Israel, 225 miles north of Egypt, and 475 miles east of Athens, Greece. With these figures in mind, it is no small wonder that it was said of Cyprus that "he who would become and remain a great power in the east must hold Cyprus in hand."⁶ As a result of this strategic position, Cyprus has been the center of attention of great powers for centuries, including Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, Rome and Venice. Today's struggle for control of Cyprus continues between Greece and Turkey, and it is this issue that forms the major dispute.

In today's situation, Cyprus is a divided island, politically, militarily, and economically. The current division concerns not only its inhabitants, the Cypriots, but also Greece and Turkey (the combatants), NATO, the United States, and now the Soviet Union. This division is rooted in a series of events that transpired prior to, during, and after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974.

The year 1974 found Cyprus an independent republic (since August 16, 1960) fraught with internal strife, terrorist activities, and open clashes between the United

⁶Michael and Hanka Lee, Cyprus (Harrisburg Pa.: Stockpole Books, 1973), p. Front Flap.

Nations peacekeeping forces trying to maintain peace and order and island rebels supporting the "enosis" movement. "Enosis" was a Greek government backed movement to unite Cyprus and Greece. This was a popular movement during this time period in Greece and in Cyprus with the Greek Cypriot community. An earlier vote among the Greek Cypriots indicated that 95.7% of the community favored union with Greece.⁷ This is important considering that 80% of the island's population were Greek Cypriots and only 18% Turkish Cypriots (the remaining 4% made up of minorities).⁸

It was not just Greek Cypriot's favoring "enosis" that caused the disunity and terrorist activities. The Turkish Cypriot community did not favor "enosis"; they favored "taksim" instead. "Taksim" was the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot backed movement calling for the partition of Cyprus and the establishment of two separate bi-national governments: a Turkish nation in the north and a Greek nation in the south.⁹

The real turmoil between the two communities stemmed from their co-agreed 1960 constitution. The constitution of Cyprus provided for a presidential form of government, with

⁷Lee, p. 57.

⁸Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus the Tragedy and the Challenge (Washington D.C.: Hellenic Institute Inc., 1975), p. 1.

⁹Dimitris C. Constatas and Theodore A. Couloumbis, "Prospects for Peace and Co-operation," Athena, (December 1987), p. 351.

the president, a Greek elected by the Greek community, and the vice president, a Turk elected by the Turkish community. Each official was granted a veto right over foreign affairs, defense and internal security. In the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, the Turks were granted 30% of the seats, again to be elected by their own community. Any amendment to the constitution required the consent of a separate two-thirds majority from representatives of each community. However, this effort to minimize understandings and defuse the separatist movements between the two communities had the opposite effect. The rift that had developed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was now clearly established in their form of republic.

Although the government's forum seemed well balanced, the two communities could not agree on implementation of the terms of the constitution. The Greek majority saw the constitution as a hindrance to "enosis." The Turks, on the other hand, feared that erosion of their rights would soon leave them with no rights at all. This brought about a period of domestic political crisis which the United Nations Security Council responded to by establishing the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).¹⁰

In the summer of 1974 the Greek military Junta, pushing for "enosis," had 650 Greek regular army officers

¹⁰Al J. Venter, "Blue Helmets on the Green Line, the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," International Defense Review, (November 1988), p. 1431.

serving with the Cyprus National Guard. On July 15, 1974, these Greek officers on instructions from the military Junta in Athens, led a successful coup d'etat and overthrew the legitimate government of Cyprus.¹¹ Immediately following the coup, announcements were made that the structure of the government would not be changed. Britain, along with other NATO countries, condemned the coup and favored the restoration of President Makarios (the ousted President of Cyprus). The United States, however, refrained from putting the responsibility for the coup on the Junta. No doubt this stance was interpreted by Ankara as placid United States' acceptance of a new state of affairs in Cyprus.

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit flew to London to consult with the British while the Turkish military prepared for a military solution to the coup. He made the trip because Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Greece were co-guarantors of the Independence of Cyprus under the August 16, 1960, Treaty of Guarantee. Because no agreement could be reached with Greece after mediation attempts by both the United Kingdom and Turkey, Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974, with a large naval task force.¹²

On July 23, 1974, soon after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Greek Junta fell. The officers, after the

¹¹Polyviou, p. 55.

¹²"The Battle for Cyprus," Newsweek, (July 29, 1974), pp. 44-49.

failure of the coup, voluntarily stepped down in favor of a civilian government. Turkey and Greece signed a declaration on July 26, 1974, only days after the invasion. The declaration, signed in Geneva, agreed to a cease-fire in Cyprus and stated that peace negotiations would start on August 8, 1974. However, negotiations halted after proposals and requests from Greece were rejected by Turkey. On August 14, 1974, the Turkish Army attacked for the second time and slashed across Cyprus, both east and west, partitioning the island in two.¹³ In three days Turkish operations had gained control of nearly 40% of the northern part of the island.¹⁴ Because of the invasion and partition of Cyprus, "nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots had been driven from their homes in the north, while 37,000 Turkish Cypriots had been forced to leave the Greek areas."¹⁵

Cyprus today remains a divided country with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities existing independently of each other. In the north, the Turkish backed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus exists with its own parliamentary government administering to approximately 36% of the island. In the south, the Greek Cypriot administration governs the

¹³Polyviou, p. 57.

¹⁴Van Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983, the View from Athens," International Security, (Spring 1985), p. 197.

¹⁵Venter, p. 1435.

majority of the island's population and the remainder of the island. Negotiations between these two communities continue today with no apparent results except the negotiations themselves.

To bring events up to date it is important to note several key differences that exist today. They are:

1. The existence of a 180 kilometer buffer zone referred to as the "Greek Line", manned by 2,100 UNFICYP troops and located at the point of partition.

2. Current United Nations sources estimate there are 29,500 Turkish regular soldiers in northern Cyprus.¹⁶

3. On 15 November 1983 the Turkish Cypriots announced the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus followed on May 5, 1985 by the popular approval of a constitution for the new Republic.

4. Today's Turkish Cypriot community includes over 20,000 mainland Turkish settlers brought over from Turkey after the 1974 invasion.

5. The economic status in Cyprus today is very different from the one during the time frame surrounding the Turkish invasion in 1974. The average inflation rate on Cyprus in 1975-1976 was 4.2%.¹⁷ Today the economic picture

¹⁶Ibid., p. 1436.

¹⁷North Cyprus Almanack (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1987), p. 80.

is brightening for the Greek Cypriot community that is led by President George Vassiliou. The inflation rate in this southern nation was 3% at the end of 1987, and the economy was gaining strength.¹⁸ An indication of this growth is the ranking of the Greek Cypriot merchant shipping industry by the World Shipping Registry, moving them from 32nd in the world in 1982 to seventh during the fourth quarter of 1988.¹⁹ The one weak spot in the economy is the \$113 million trade deficit at the end of 1987. Efforts to off-set this trade problem are underway and programs are being designed to correct the import/export deficit.

To the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' economy is floundering. Its efforts to reduce inflation, which registered at 31.45% in June 1988, are failing, and inflation continues to grow.²⁰ Here the trade deficit is also a problem, totaling \$166 million at the end of 1987. Despite the staggering economy, close ties to Turkey continue. Efforts are being made to expand international markets and remove trade barriers with the Greek Cypriot community. In the final economic analysis, both communities are striving for closer ties with EC markets

¹⁸Country Report: Lebanon, Cyprus, No.1 (January 25, 1988), p. 19.

¹⁹Country Report: Lebanon, Cyprus, No.4 (October 7, 1988), p. 26.

²⁰Ibid.

and each other in an effort to strengthen their own economies.

6. The Soviet Union maintains an ongoing interest in the Cyprus dispute. Their ultimate goal is total non-militarization of the island. The withdrawal of all military forces to include two United Kingdom air bases on Cyprus is viewed as the Soviet solution to the current partition of the island. Soviet interest was demonstrated recently (December 1987) by the visit of Soviet envoy Vladimir Longinov to Cyprus following the Washington summit meeting that took place earlier between President Reagan and President Gorbachev.²¹

TERRITORIAL WATER DISPUTE

Today's dispute over the territorial waters of the Aegean Sea began in 1920. Because of its alignment with the Central Powers during World War I, Turkey was a defeated nation at the end of the Great War. Under the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, a mandate from the Allies granted Greece, a member of the Alliance, large land areas in western Turkey. However, a revolutionary government take over and the subsequent changes by Kemal Ataturk in 1920 threatened Greece's claim to the Turkish areas ceded to it by the Treaty of Sevres. In response to this situation in 1921, Greece invaded western

²¹Country Report: Lebanon, Cyprus, No.1 (January 25, 1988), p. 17.

Turkey in the vicinity of Izmir. The Greek invasion forces, due to the combination of extended lines-of-communication (LOCs) and a seasonal change to winter, were soundly defeated by Kemal Ataturk's forces. This period of instability and open hostility was finally soothed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The four signatories - Greece, Turkey, France - and the United Kingdom, established an agreeable division of the areas disputed from the earlier Treaty of Sevres. In addition to granting Greece ownership of several islands in the Aegean (from north to south: Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Icaria),

the Treaty of Lausanne set the limit of territorial waters at 3 nautical miles. Later in 1936 Greece unilaterally extended her territorial waters to 6 miles. Turkey followed suit in 1964.²²

The situation today remains much as it was in 1964, with both Greece and Turkey recognizing the six-mile territorial sea limit in the Aegean. However, a threat to the status quo arose from the 1958 First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. On the issue of territorial sea limits, UNCLOS I "defined a so-called Contiguous Zone, up to 12 miles from the shore, in which coastal states would have

²²Alford, p. 59.

Jurisdiction over customs, fiscal, sanitary and immigration arrangements."²³

Although numerous international states have adapted the twelve mile zone, neither Greece nor Turkey have signed the Convention. With the current six-mile limit, Greek territorial waters form 35% of the Aegean Sea while Turkey's part is only 8.8%. The fear on Turkey's part is that if Greece adopts the twelve mile limit, the openness of the Aegean will cease to exist. With a twelve mile limit, Greek control would increase to 63.9% and Turkey to only 10%. This would leave only 26.9% of the Aegean classified as High Seas (international waters).²⁴ Turkey views this extension as a threat because with the reduced size of international waters, their vessels would have no choice but to transit Greek territorial waters to gain access to both the Mediterranean Sea and the High Seas of the Aegean. From the opposite perspective, with greater control Greek shipping would enjoy a much greater degree of freedom and possibly greater economic prosperity than Turkish shipping.

It was this dispute during the post-Turkish invasion of Cyprus that lead to the next problem, that of Aegean air-traffic-control. Actions taken since 1974 to resolve the territorial limits dispute are discussed in Chapter Five.

²³Wilson, p. 4.

²⁴Ibid., p. 5.

AEGEAN AIR-TRAFFIC-CONTROL

The current dispute over control of air traffic transiting Aegean airspace surfaced immediately following the crisis in Cyprus. Flight Information Regions (FIRs) are established and controlled by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an element of the United Nations. These FIRs monitor and control aircraft transiting the FIRs zone of control.

During the 1952 regional conference of ICAO with Greece and Turkey, all three parties agreed that all Aegean airspace except that directly off the coastline of Turkey would be part of the Athens FIR. This meant that all Turkish aircraft passing into the FIR were required to report position and flight plans to Athens. Turkish aircraft flying west from Izmir were in the Athens' FIR within minutes of take-off. From the opposite perspective, Greek aircraft flying east from Athens could fly to positions within miles of the Turkish coastline before entering Turkish airspace and reporting to the air-traffic-controllers in Izmir.

After the invasion of Cyprus, in an effort to offset the possible threat and inconvenience posed by Greek control of Aegean airspace, Turkey issued NOTAM 714 on August 4, 1974. The NOTAM is a notice to ICAO for transmission to all airspace users.²⁵ NOTAM 714 required all aircraft (military

²⁵Ibid., p. 6.

and civilian) that passed a mid-Aegean reporting line approaching Turkey to report both position and flight plan information to air-traffic-controllers in Izmir. This requirement while still in international airspace caused an outcry of protest from the Greek government. In response to Turkey's new reporting requirement, Greece issued NOTAM 1157 on September 13, 1974, which declared the Aegean airspace as a danger zone because of the conflicting reporting requirements from Athens and Izmir. This attempt by Turkey to limit access to its airspace has been an issue that has been the subject of negotiations and is still a point of discord today.

MILITARIZATION OF GREEK ISLANDS

Turkey's July invasion and its August follow-on push south into the heart of Cyprus, established what is currently the border between the Greek Cypriots in the south and the Turkish Cypriots in the north (the Green Line). Immediately after the August 14, 1974, Turkish drive south, Greek Militarization of islands in the Eastern Aegean began. Fearing further military aggression from Turkey, Greece increased its military presence in the Eastern Aegean by deploying Greek armed forces, specifically to islands in close proximity to the Turkish coast. The military build-up and fortification took place on the islands of (from north to

south) Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Icaria and the Dodecanese Islands in the Southeastern Aegean.

Turkey's response to the new Greek forces on its doorstep was a quick one. Citing both the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1946), Turkey claimed the militarization of these islands violated these treaties. No real headway was made to withdraw the Greek forces, so in 1975 Turkey countered the Greek move by establishing the Aegean Fourth Army and deployed this 123,000 man force along its Western Aegean coastline. "Greek offensive preparations were given the reason for setting up the Turkish Fourth Army [The Army of the Aegean]."26 Unlike the majority of the Turkish military forces, "the Army of the Aegean" was a non-NATO affiliated unit and was considered a Turkish national asset.

Since 1975, the Turkish Fourth Army has maintained its deployment on the east coast. Greece on the other hand, has continued to build-up its military assets on certain islands. The Greek island of Lemnos, which lies just 65 kilometers west of the mouth of the Strait of Dardanelles, has become the focal point in this dispute. In addition to a major Greek navy base at Mitilini, Lesbos, Greece also "stationed troops and fighter aircraft there and seeking to have them assigned to NATO as a second line of defense."27

26Wilson, p. 16.

27Country Profile: Greece, 1988-1989, (June 1988), p. 9.

Turkey objects to the build-up and today these forces continue to face each in a stalemate of inaction.

In summary, the problems created by the forced division of Cyprus, disagreement over oil and mineral rights of the Aegean continental shelf, the dispute over air-traffic reporting requirements while in international airspace over the Aegean, and the question of Greek militarization of the islands in the Eastern Aegean leaves today's problem: conflict between two NATO allies, both of equal importance to the United States.

CHAPTER 3

REGIONAL IMPORTANCE

GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE

Although Greece and Turkey are both geographically isolated from the rest of NATO by communist countries and water, they are of growing strategic military importance to the United States and NATO. The maritime geography and location of each country combine to form vital areas of military interest to the United States.

Considering the recent Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and its effects on reducing ground based nuclear weapons in Europe, maritime launched nuclear weapons will take on greater importance and significance in the very near future.

The strategic importance of nuclear weapons deployed on submarines and surface ships will be considerably increased and so will the value of sea lanes traversing relatively narrow bodies of water in the... Mediterranean Sea.¹

This emphasis on maritime launched nuclear weapons increases the importance that both Greece and Turkey play in controlling the Mediterranean sea lines of communication (SLOC) and the southern region as a whole. Their value is underscored when one considers that it is through these waters that a ship from

¹Theodore A. Couloumbis and Costas Hadjiconstantinou, "Greece's Role in a Changing Global Setting," NATO Review, (August 1988), p. 24.

Europe must pass to reach the Black Sea or to transit the Suez Canal en route to the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf.

Geographically, Greece's location in the Eastern Mediterranean is very important. Greece is primarily a maritime nation, and its control over large areas of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas is of strategic interest to the United States and NATO in defense planning. Greece's 1,000 kilometer border with three communist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) and a common border with Turkey in Thrace are important points, but of secondary importance in relation to its commanding position within the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Both the mainland of Greece and the island of Crete provide valuable locations from which to control and guard the Aegean approaches to the Mediterranean. Also noteworthy, is the role these locations play in providing naval ports, forward basing facilities, and supply depots for United States naval and air forces. It is Greece's centralized position, controlling location, and its proximity to the Soviet Union that underscore its strategic importance to both the United States and NATO.

Examination of the other key player, Turkey, offers this determination of its importance in the region: "Turkey derives its significance from its pivotal position between

Western Europe, the Middle East and the Warsaw Pact nations."2 As the pivotal hub, Turkey maintains a 610 kilometer border with the Soviet Union and shares borders with Bulgaria, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece. Also of importance geographically is the fact that Turkey constitutes and defends approximately 27% of NATO's European land area.3 However, possibly the most important geographical factor to consider when studying Turkey are the Turkish Straits:

Running northeast to southwest, the Straits comprise: the river-like Bosphorus, about 18 miles long and as narrow as 800 yards wide; the Dardanelles, about 47 miles long and three to four miles wide; and the lake-like Sea of Marmora in between.4

The significance of Turkey's ability to control the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, (which form the channel that connects the Black Sea to the Aegean), and to restrict, monitor, or influence Soviet naval access into the Mediterranean Sea is no small matter. Also of value is Turkey's jurisdiction over both "the most direct air and overland routes between the Soviet Union and the Middle East

2Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, "Turkey Comes to Terms With Its Vulnerability," Jane's Defence Weekly, (2 July 1988), p. 1378.

3Ibid.

4Charles Maechling Jr., "Crisis at the Turkish Straits," Proceedings, (August 1988), p. 45.

and Africa."⁵ Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union is another factor adding to its prominence when considering the United States Intelligence collection assets located in-country. This proximity factor points to Turkey as an important ally for the United States and also for other NATO nations with concerns in this region.

SOVIET UNION REGIONAL INFLUENCE

Former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in stating the Soviet Union's position on the southern region commented:

We want the Mediterranean Sea to become a sea of peace, good-neighborliness and cooperation. We realize that it is far from easy to reach this goal, since there exist too many knots of tension, too many contradictory interests of states.⁶

Recent Soviet efforts in the region have been made to gain the trust of both Greece and Turkey. The Soviet's ultimate aim is to disrupt the southern elements of NATO, thereby giving themselves more freedom in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The primary tool the Soviets use to achieve this goal is the Soviet Navy.

In time of war or conflict, a critical objective of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean would be the

⁵United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region, Report, (7 October 1986), p. 45.

⁶Carl F. Pinketele and Adamantia Pollis, ed., The Contemporary Mediterranean World (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 19.

seizure of the Turkish Straits, which form the only sea route from the Black Sea for the Soviet Union, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Soviet control of the straits would be critical for the re-supply and augmentation of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (the Fifth Squadron) with elements from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. In addition to being important militarily, the straits are of growing importance to the Soviet Union's economy. Currently it is estimated that "In peacetime, some 50-60 percent of Soviet imports and exports pass through the Dardanelles."⁷ It appears that in the future the Soviet use of the straits will continue to increase in order to support the growing Soviet economy surrounding the Black Sea. Because the Soviets value the use of the straits, the adjacent Black Sea Fleet plays a vital role in the Soviet's strategy to control this region.

It is this Soviet reliance on the straits and the inherent lack of control that goes along with Turkish control of the straits that have caused the Soviet naval build-up in the Black Sea. The Black Sea Fleet headquarters at Sevastopol and the huge Soviet naval yard at Nikolayev, combine to form the main assets behind the Soviet efforts. "Nearly one third of the major surface combatants in the

⁷"NATO's Southern Region: Strategy and Resources for Coalition Defense," Report by Project on a Resources Strategy for the U.S. and its Allies, Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, (September 1988), p. 9.

Soviet Navy are based in the Black Sea⁸; therefore, it is no coincidence that the only two 18,000-ton Soviet Moskva-class anti-submarine warfare helicopter carriers (called anti-submarine cruisers by the Soviets) in the entire Soviet Navy are assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.⁹

Also of note are the Soviet efforts to gain greater influence in the region through ongoing ship building work at the Nikolayev ship yards. Because of the importance seaborne air power is pictured as playing in future Soviet efforts to project naval power, two Sovetskij Sojuz-class (70,000-ton) conventional large-deck aircraft carriers are under construction in the Nikolayev ship yards. The first carrier, the Tbilisi, was launched in 1985 and is currently preparing to begin sea trials in the Black Sea. With its full complement of 70-75 fixed wing aircraft, depending on the type of fighter or attack aircraft deployed, the Tbilisi will be able to project its air power out to a maximum combat radius of 800 nautical miles. Meanwhile, the second full-sized carrier is still under construction.¹⁰ Whenever and wherever the Soviet Navy ultimately deploys these ships,

⁸United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations, p. 45.

⁹Floyd C. Painter, "The Soviet Navy Threat: A Re-Examination (Part Two)," Defense Electronics, (May 1988), p. 94.

¹⁰Norman Polmar, "The Soviet Navy. The New Carrier," Proceedings, (August 1988), p. 66.

there will undoubtedly be an increase in local Soviet naval capabilities and a substantial improvement in their ability to project military influence over much greater areas than before.

One major factor however, that confronts the growing Soviet Navy in its efforts to increase Soviet regional influence is the restrictions governing Soviet use of the Turkish Straits. As a result of the 1936 Montreux Treaty, ownership and control of the straits was transferred to the Turkish government from the international commission that previously governed them, in effect granting Turkey total control of the straits. Current Turkish provisions stipulate:

Light surface vessels of 10,000-ton or less, minor war vessels, and auxiliaries of Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers were authorized transit up to an aggregate of 15,000-tons or nine vessels. Capital ships (generally accepted as battleships and cruisers) of non-Black Sea powers were denied access to the straits, but capital ships of Black Sea powers could exceed the 15,000-ton limitation provided they passed through singly and were accompanied by not more than two escort vessels... All transits of foreign warships through the straits were made subject to advance notification and pilotage requirements.¹¹

In reference to aircraft carriers, such as the Soviet Kiev-class (43,000-tons), the Moskva-class (18,000-ton), and the new Sovetskij Sojuz-class being built and tested at

¹¹Maechling, p. 68.

Nikolayev on the Black Sea, the Montreux Treaty is intentionally vague. The Treaty does however "stipulate that aircraft carriers may enter the waterway at the invitation of Turkey to make local port calls, but may not pass into either the Black Sea or the Mediterranean."¹² These limitations pose severe problems for the Soviet Navy's movement through the straits, specifically the new large-deck aircraft carriers. The limitations also create hardships for Soviet efforts to surge ships through the straits if necessary, because of the Turkish requirement for advance notification of eight days prior to beginning the transit of the straits.

One method successfully used by the Soviet Union to bypass the restrictions imposed by the Treaty on the passage of aircraft carriers has been to classify the carriers as cruisers. As stated previously for example, the Moskva-class ASW-helicopter carriers are termed anti-submarine cruisers. More recently, the Kiev-class vertical/short take off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft carriers, armed with 30-40 V/STOL fixed wing aircraft have been classified aircraft-carrying cruisers by the Soviet Union because of the ship's cruiser-like bow. In addition to the two Moskva-class carriers assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, one Kiev-class carrier is now attached to the Fleet, and all three carriers freely transit the straits.

¹²Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, Adelphi Papers Vol. 229, (1988), p. 34.

None of the other Montreux Treaty signatories (Turkey, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) have objected to the Soviet Navy's cruiser classification of the Moskva or Kiev-class carriers. Nor have they challenged the Soviet's "right to transit the straits either at the time of first passage or since."¹³ In summary, although the Montreux Treaty places restrictions on carrier-class ships, the lack of protest from any of the Treaty signatories over the Soviet carrier classification system, has given the Soviet Union tacit approval for ships to transit the straits. With this background, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union will face protest from any of the signatories when its first Sovetskij Sojuz-class large-deck carrier is completed and ready to sail through the straits as early as 1990.

Because Soviet regional influence depends heavily on the Soviet Navy's ability to project military power, forward operating shore-based facilities are critical to continue supporting future naval operations. After the loss of access to Albanian ports in 1961 and to Egyptian port facilities in 1976, the Soviet Union in an effort to make up for its shortage of shore-based anchorages began developing the capability to use off-shore anchorages or bases to conduct limited repairs and ship replenishment. This capability

¹³Maechling, p. 68.

exists today in the Mediterranean and has been expanded to include limited dry-dock facilities and submarine assistance facilities. This capability will theoretically allow Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean to remain combat ready "for several weeks after the closing of the straits,"¹⁴ an ability the Soviet Navy has lacked in previous times.

It is this shortage of facilities, however, that has forced the Soviet Union to tailor its Mediterranean Squadron. The result of this deficiency has been to limit the number of ships and their on-station time in the Mediterranean Sea and to establish plans for quick reinforcement of the Fifth Squadron from the Black Sea Fleet when conditions warrant. This inability to gain forward operating, land based facilities has had a limiting effect on Soviet efforts to expand their regional influence and control.

In its continuing efforts to alleviate this shortage of land based facilities, the Soviet Union in a recent agreement with the government of Syria has begun expanding the Syrian port of Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean. Tartus initially came into heavy Soviet use following the 1976 expulsion of the Soviet Union from Egypt. The current expansion will provide greater facilities for Soviet submarines and surface combatant ships operating in the

¹⁴Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, Second Edition (Annapolis Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 507.

Mediterranean. Tartus "has been described by US intelligence as the largest Soviet naval forward deployment base outside the USSR."¹⁵ This clearly indicates the Soviet Union's intent to continue its efforts in expanding regional influence and authority through the use of its Mediterranean Squadron and Black Sea Fleet. Also easily discerned is the fact that the Soviet Union sees a potential threat to itself and its goals with any expanded United States or NATO involvement in this region.

In direct dealings with both Greece and Turkey, the Soviet Union has placed obvious importance on building close relationships and ties. Turkey plays an important role in Soviet foreign policy because of its key geographical location on the southern border of the Soviet Union and because of its strategic value drawn from the ownership and control of the Turkish Straits. Although Turkey has been extremely critical of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, "Moscow has been tolerant of the range of political regimes in Turkey, to which it has offered extensive economic aid."¹⁶ The increasing economic relationship with the Soviet Union remains separate from the

¹⁵"Soviets Set to Expand Tartus Base," Jane's Defence Weekly, (21 May 1988), p. 824.

¹⁶Duygu B. Sezer, "Peaceful Coexistence: Turkey and the Near East in Soviet Foreign Policy," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (September 1985), p. 117.

political one. Much to the chagrin of the Soviets, Turkey has continued to view the Soviet Union as its primary threat.

Soviet relations with Greece on the other hand continue to grow closer. The recent movement of Greek foreign policy dealings away from any dependence on either the United States or NATO has been applauded by the Soviet Union. In October 1987, a large step was made in Greek-Soviet relations with the start-up of construction in Thessaloniki, Greece, of an alumina plant. The plant extracts alumina from bauxite ore for the production of aluminum. In addition to providing \$130 million for the plant, the Soviet Union also supplied the plant design, special technical advisors, and worker training packages. In return, Greece agreed to purchase a large percentage of the necessary plant equipment from the Soviet Union. The plant cooperation agreement also calls for the Soviet Union to purchase 600,000 tons of alumina per year, which equates to almost the total production capability of the plant.¹⁷ With the creation of this new industry in Thessaloniki, Greece will become one of the largest alumina producers in the world, and the Soviet Union will reap the benefits of closer relations with Greece and a large new source of alumina.

Another factor that is strengthening Greek-Soviet ties is the continuing anti-American, anti-NATO sentiment of

¹⁷D. Stamou, "A Big Step," Athena, (November 1987), p. 316.

the Greek government and people. The Soviets have not so much fueled the fire of anti-Americanism as they have helped the Greeks economically, allowing them to see others, such as the Soviets themselves, as their allies. Ongoing Soviet efforts to link the European Community (EC) with the Soviet equivalent (COMECON) shows an increasing desire on the part of the Soviet Union to become actively involved in European economic markets and organizations. Soviet efforts to tie markets together will only increase as President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union broadens and continues his internal economic recovery program (Perestroyka).

One final issue that is important to consider when studying Soviet efforts to influence the region is the Soviet Union's position on the Cyprus issue. To date, the Soviet Union has maintained a non-aligned status with both Cypriot communities in an effort to avoid alienating either Greece or Turkey. This tactic has been successful thus far, and the Soviet Union continues to call for peace and for settlement of the ongoing dispute on Cyprus. What is important, however, is that these Soviet calls for moderation and reunification form a cover, a deception, for what continues to be the Soviet Union's primary objective on Cyprus: "the neutralization and demilitarization"¹⁸ of the island. Because British military facilities on Cyprus could

¹⁸Seezer, p. 124.

be used as forward staging areas for NATO air and naval forces, Soviet interests in the Mediterranean would benefit greatly if all foreign military forces were withdrawn from the island.

In summary, the region will continue to grow in military and economic importance to the Soviet Union. Evidence of this growth can be seen in the increased strength and capabilities of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and in the current build-up of Soviet naval facilities at Tartus, Syria. Soviet political and economic efforts to increase regional influence can also be seen in the strengthening of Soviet ties with Greece, and the Soviet Union's continuing efforts to establish closer economic ties between COMECON and the EC.

VULNERABILITY OF NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

Considering the Soviet Union's growing interest in the southern region and its efforts to gain greater influence with the member states, it is important to note that NATO's southern flank contains several areas that pose potential threats to the security of the Alliance. Specifically the vulnerable areas are in eastern Turkey and along the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace. From the facts presented in Chapter Two of this study, that determination is made that

NATO's greatest challenge is the southern region's Greek-Turkish hostility. Alliance military coordination in the Eastern

Mediterranean has been almost non-existent since 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus.¹⁹

It is this bilateral dispute between Greece and Turkey that poses the primary threat to the Alliance's southern flank.

Following the 1974 Cyprus conflict and the subsequent Turkish refusal to remove its military forces from the Island, Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis removed all Greek military forces from the integrated military structure of NATO in protest. Greece's position was that because both Turkey and the United Kingdom were co-guarantors of the Independence of Cyprus (1960 Treaty of Guarantee), and both were members of NATO, that either the United Kingdom, NATO or the United States should have intervened to end the Turkish military occupation of Northern Cyprus. No country did, and Greece partially broke its ties with NATO by removing itself from NATO's military wing. Greece did, however, continue to maintain its position in the political wing of NATO, but neither participated "in the NATO Defense Planning Committee or assigned troops to NATO commands."²⁰ With this withdrawal, Greece lost NATO control over the Aegean airspace from the east coast of Greece to the Athens-Istanbul FIR just off Turkey's west coast. This mission was transferred to Turkey in July 1978 when the United States turned over

¹⁹"NATO's Southern Region," p. iv.

²⁰United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations, p. 32.

command of the 6th Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF) in Izmir, Turkey, to a Turkish Air Force general. Soon after control of SIXATAF was transferred, the United States also passed command of Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST), located in Izmir, to the Turkish Army.

In 1978 and 1979, efforts were being taken to reintegrate Greece into the NATO military command. As part of the reintegration efforts, NATO called for Greece to establish a separate Greek land and air headquarters in Larissa, Greece: Allied Land Forces South Central Europe (LANDSOUTHCENT), with its own air command, Seventh Allied Tactical Air Force (SEVENATAF). This reorganization of the regional command and control structure was not immediately or entirely accepted by Greece. The effort to reintegrate Greece that eventually succeeded was the November 1979 proposal made by the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Bernard Rogers. The Rogers Plan was designed to reduce the problems facing the Greek re-entry into the military wing of NATO by addressing both Greek and Turkish concerns. Up to this point, the major roadblock facing Greece's reintegration into the military wing of NATO was the dissenting vote of Turkey. This stumbling block was a result of the difficulties created by the ongoing Aegean disputes (see Chapter Two) as well as a new problem, that of the Greek refusal to recognize Turkish control over Aegean airspace, a situation that had been created by the NATO

reorganization. Greece wanted the Aegean operational responsibilities to return to the former state of affairs upon their reintegration into NATO. Greece's contention was that restructuring the NATO command and control system (i.e. transferring of command of SIXATAF and LANDSOUTHEAST from the United States to Turkey) did not justify the westward expansion of airspace under the control of SIXATAF (under Turkish control). This restructuring had, in effect, placed the airspace over the eastern Greek islands under Turkish control. It had also taken a former unified command, which had once included military personnel and units from both Greece and Turkey, and divided these into separate national commands in each country. The end result of the restructuring has been the collapse of an integrated defense in the area and the termination of combined planning and exercise between the two former allies.

On October 22, 1980, after six years absence and numerous proposal submissions from General Rogers, Greece rejoined the integrated military command structure of NATO. The agreement to reintegrate, however, was not without problems. Notably, the final plan lacked an agreement on the Greek-Turkish Aegean command and control issue. The intent of the Rogers Plan, and what was agreed to by both Greece and Turkey, was for this remaining issue to be resolved independently between Greek and Turkish military authorities. Today this critical issue remains to be reconciled, and the

non-implementation of portions of the Rogers Plan relating to command structures and areas of operational responsibilities, remain a major source of tension with NATO and in Greek-Turkish relations.²¹

This relationship was further complicated in September 1983, when Greece withdrew its military forces from planning and participation in NATO regional military exercises. This withdrawal was in protest to the failure of NATO exercise planning to include the Greek island of Lemnos. Lemnos was part of the bilateral dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Greek militarization of Aegean islands. Because of Turkish protests over the possible inclusion of the island, Lemnos was not included; and Greece withdrew from further NATO exercises.

The outgrowth of these situations is that critical coordination on southern region issues and NATO air defense matters is severely impaired. This weakness in NATO's southern flank is of growing importance when the deployment of new Soviet high-performance aircraft in the region is considered. The regional threat now includes SU-24 Fencer fighter-bombers and Soviet Naval Aviation Backfire bombers armed with cruise missiles. Both aircraft are capable of striking Allied naval forces throughout the region.²²

²¹Van Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View From Athens," International Security, (Spring 1985), pp. 200-201.

²²"NATO's Southern Region," p. 7.

Another element where the southern region is considered vulnerable, unlike its counter-part in the central region of Europe, is in its weapons systems quality and quantity. Unlike other areas of NATO, in the southern region "the Pact's quantitative superiority is not offset by any qualitative NATO advantage. Greek and Turkish equipment in particular is decidedly obsolescent."²³ Much of the military equipment used by both countries is from World War II or the Korean War, and spare parts are increasingly short of supply or unavailable. Current United States and NATO efforts are being taken to modernize and upgrade both countries' military forces. In Turkey's case alone, however, United States

officials have estimated that it would take roughly \$1.2 billion a year in US military aid for at least a decade to modernize Turkey's military to a standard compatible with NATO requirements.²⁴

The cost is high but appears necessary to build a force capable of defending against the growing Soviet threat.

In summary, the southern region is inherently more vulnerable than other areas of the Alliance because of its isolation from other NATO countries. It is this geographical isolation, coupled with poor Greek-Turkish relations and the requirement for sizable military modernization efforts in

²³Ibid., p. v.

²⁴United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations, p. 47.

both countries, that make the vulnerability of NATO's southern flank painfully clear. This vulnerability makes close relations with the United States and NATO of growing importance to all countries involved.

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND TURKEY

With the passage of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, both Greece and Turkey moved out from under the British sphere of influence. The economic and military assistance provided by the United States increasingly brought Greece and Turkey under American control and influence. Subsequently, both countries followed the United States and joined NATO in 1952. Since that time, the United States has remained the dominant power in the southern region, maintaining close relations with Greece and Turkey and acting as the principal force that binds NATO's southern flank. Today, the regional command structure is "dominated by U.S. officers to a far greater extent than in central or northern Europe, [and] reflects the key role"²⁵ the United States plays in the defense of NATO's southern flank. At the same time it is important to understand that, during the interim years from 1947 to the present, United States relations with both countries have undergone periods of stress and disagreement. The issues that have consistently been a source of this

²⁵"NATO's Southern Region," p. 1.

stress and that have grown in importance during recent years are United States military assistance granted to each country and United States in-country basing rights. Before addressing Greek and Turkish relations with the United States in those terms, a study of the two current policies that control and govern United States military aid to our southern region allies is necessary. Neither system described controls Economic Support Funds (ESF), which the United States gives to Turkey but no longer grants to Greece (stopped in 1976).

The first policy, the Seven to Ten Ratio (7:10), is more a method of practice and a tradition, than an approved United States policy governing the granting of military aid to either Greece or Turkey. This system of using the ratio 7:10, for supplying United States military assistance to Greece and Turkey respectively, was developed and adopted by the United States Congress in 1980. The purpose of this system was to insure that the principles contained in Section 620C (enacted in 1978) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, were followed. This section specifically applied to Greece and Turkey, and stated that:

...the United States will furnish security assistance for Greece and Turkey only when furnishing that assistance is intended solely for defensive purposes...and shall be designed to ensure that the present balance of military strength among countries in the region, including Greece and Turkey, is preserved. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the transfer of defense articles to Greece or Turkey for

legitimate self-defense or to enable Greece or Turkey to fulfill their NATO obligations.²⁶

Using this 7:10 ratio concept, Congress has determined the level of United States military aid for Greece and Turkey for the past eight years. Because this system provides a predictable balance in United States aid, Greece demands no less than the 7:10 ratio from the United States, in an effort to promote stability between itself and Turkey and to assure that the regional balance of power will not shift in Turkey's favor. Turkey, on the other hand would prefer that no aid ratio existed to restrict its receiving of United States military aid. As a formula for determining aid levels, the ratio system serves a purpose, but it does this at a sizable cost to both United States foreign policy efforts and to Turkey. Several examples of how the ratio adversely impacts on the United States are:

- It offers a device to constrain large increases in military aid to Turkey by obligating increases for Greece as well...

- the ratio per se does not serve Congress's stated goal of preserving a balance in military terms because there are many other factors beyond U.S. control in determining the military balance between Greece and Turkey;

- It is a mechanistic and inflexible way to deal with the subtle and changing diplomatic needs in the region...

- It sets a bad precedent for general U.S. aid programs and potentially involves

²⁶Ellen Lalpson, "The Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Congressional Tradition," Congressional Research Service, (April 1985), pp. 2-3.

the United States in bilateral problems it does not want to become entangled in.²⁷

The aforementioned recent Greek efforts have been to insure the continued use of the 7:10 ratio in future assessments of United States military aid. Greece considers Section 620C of the Foreign Assistance Act to be the substantiation and final approval for the 1980 congressional practice of providing aid to Greece and Turkey on a 7:10 ratio. Although the Carter and Reagan administrations did not recognize any formalization of the 7:10 ratio, they did recognize that some sort of balance must be maintained between the two countries to keep stability in the region; therefore, the use of the 7:10 ratio continues today.

The second policy used by the United States to control military assistance to Greece and Turkey was the Southern Region Amendment to the United States Foreign Assistance Act; approved in 1987, this "amendment authorized the free transfer of excess American defense equipment and weapons systems to the Southern Region NATO states."²⁸ This amendment was limited by the 7:10 aid ratio, and it required the Department of Defense to monitor the equipment value estimates to insure compliance with the 7:10 ratio policy.

In summary, it is these two policies, the 7:10 ratio and the Southern Region Amendment, that the United States

²⁷Ibid., pp. 10-11.

²⁸"NATO's Southern Region," p. 19.

uses to develop and provide military assistance packages to Greece and Turkey. It is this issue of military aid and its influence on in-country basing rights that currently monopolizes United States relations with both Greece and Turkey.

The United States is currently negotiating a new Agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation (DECA) with Greece. The previous DECA, the first between the United States and Greece, was signed in Athens in September 1983 and went into effect on December 20, 1983.

Under the terms of the 1983 DECA, the United States is authorized by Greece to maintain and operate military and supporting facilities within Greece and to engage in missions and activities at these installations for defense purposes....²⁹

In accordance with Article XII of the 1983 DECA, Greece notified the United States in early 1988 that the agreement would expire on December 20, 1988. This meant that either a new DECA would have to be negotiated and approved, or the United States would be given 17 months from the DECA termination date (December 20, 1988) to completely remove all United States personnel, equipment, and property from Greece. The December 1988 deadline passed and negotiations over a new DECA continued. The lack of approval for a new DECA prior to the termination of the 1983 agreement was credited to

²⁹United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations, p. 36.

upcoming Greek general elections. Elections in Greece had been scheduled for June 1989, and it was felt that if Prime Minister Papandreou signed a new defense agreement with the United States just prior to the June elections, that he would lose the support of his Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) and would lose the election. The platform supported by PASOK and Prime Minister Papandreou in October 1981, when he was first elected, was to eliminate Greece's participation in NATO and secondly to throw the United States military out of Greece. In recent years, Prime Minister Papandreou has embraced a more moderate approach towards the United States and NATO. In order to save face and votes in the June 1989 elections and maintain Greece's ties with the United States and NATO, Prime Minister Papandreou prolonged the DECA negotiations so that no new DECA approval would take place before June 1989.

As was the case with the 1983 DECA, Greece continued to tie the issue of United States military assistance for themselves to the granting of basing rights for United States forces in Greece. Although Richard Perle testified "that U.S. facilities in Greece could be replicated elsewhere and that activities associated with those facilities could be carried out from other locations,"³⁰ the United States still

³⁰Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: United States Policy Options Toward Greece and Turkey," SAIS Review, (Winter/Spring 1986), p. 151.

needed Greece's geographical location to accomplish critical military contingency missions. Key contingencies that would require the use of bases and facilities in Greece by United States military forces include: in case of full scale or global war with the Soviet Union; to defend against a direct attack in the region; to use as strong points in the event that the Soviet Union attacks in the central or northern regions; and finally, as a forward staging base for operations to be conducted in the region. This list of possible contingencies is by no means exhausted, it is simply intended to point out why the United States military needs facilities in Greece.

The primary United States military facilities in Greece help to guard the Aegean approaches to the Mediterranean; provide communication assets that link United States forces with NATO forces; provide supply depots and staging centers for naval and air forces; and finally, provide surveillance and monitoring of the Soviet Union's Eastern Mediterranean activities.³¹ As stated earlier, Greece also maintains nine NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) stations, spread throughout Greece, that provide NATO early warning information.

The most important United States military installation in Greece is the United States Sixth Fleet

³¹United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations, p. 34.

anchorage located at Souda Bay on the northwest coast of Crete. Other than the United States Navy facilities in Naples, Italy, Greece provides the only other forward support facilities available to maintain United States naval power in the region. This facility stores petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), and ammunition for the Sixth Fleet. The Souda Bay complex also maintains an airfield capable of supporting United States Air Force C-141 and C-5A aircraft. Also located on the northern coast of Crete is the electronic surveillance facility at Iraklion Air Station that monitors Soviet activity in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Two other vital United States facilities in Greece are the Nea Makri Communications Station located northeast of Athens and Hellenikon Air Base in Athens. Nea Makri is part of the global United States Defense Communications System (DCS), and it provides critical communications relay support for both the Sixth Fleet and other United States forces. The other major installation, Hellenikon Air Base, functions as both an air transport center and as base for electronic reconnaissance aircraft. During the recent DECA negotiations (September 1988), Greece informed the United States that Hellenikon Air Base will be closed at the end of the 17 month DECA clearance period and will not be re-opened.

In summary, relations between Greece and the United States are undergoing a period of stress, directly related to the current DECA negotiations. However, both the United

States and Greece, placing rhetoric aside, are of increasing importance to each other. Current efforts by Prime Minister Papandreou to strengthen Greece's economy require a strong, continued United States presence and relationship to succeed. With the amount of military assistance that Greece receives from the United States (fourth highest of all United States military assistance programs), Prime Minister Papandreou cannot afford militarily or economically to disrupt relations with the United States.

Turkish-United States relations, like Greek-United States relations, have undergone periods of intense strain during the past 15 years. Up until the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, United States dealings with Turkey had been characterized as very positive and beneficial for both countries. However, on December 18, 1974, the President of the United States, in an effort to diffuse the Cyprus issue and coerce Turkey into withdrawing its military forces from the island, signed into law an embargo against Turkey which suspended all United States military aid effective February 1975. On July 25, 1975, in response to the United States arms embargo, Turkey suspended all United States military activities in Turkey except those exclusively serving NATO requirements. United States personnel and equipment were allowed to remain in-country but were placed in a

"provisional status."³² During the ensuing years from 1975 to 1978, Turkey pursued and established closer ties with the Soviet Union.

With the lessening of tensions over Turkey's occupation of Northern Cyprus, the United States lifted the arms embargo. Although certain restrictions were lifted on earlier dates (Foreign Military Sales [FMS] credit and cash sale restrictions were lifted on August 4, 1977), final aid restrictions were released by Congress on March 21, 1978. The embargo's impact on United States-Turkish relations has lead to an erosion of trust and confidence in the United States by the Turkish population. Another important result of the embargo was that for a period of four years Turkey's supply of military aid and equipment stopped, halting the military's modernization efforts.

Recently, in an effort to enhance its economy and become less dependent on United States and other external military aid, Turkey began improving its defense industrial sector.

In an attempt to break free from dependency on foreign security assistance the Turkish Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA) was established in November 1985. It aims to coordinate

³²Richard C. Company Jr., Turkey and the United States. The Arms Embargo Period (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 56.

domestic private sector investment with foreign technology and capital.³³

In addition to establishing the DIDA in 1985, Turkey also created the Defense Industrial Support Fund. This new defense fund was designed to provide funds for upgrading the Turkish defense industry. It is supported monetarily by increased taxes and from budget resources in the Turkish government. These programs have achieved a moderate level of success in building the Turkish economy and in improving Turkish military combat readiness. The success of these programs also provided Turkey with the opportunity to be less dependent on foreign countries for military assistance (i.e., less dependent on the United States).

Unlike the problems encountered negotiating the new DECA agreement between Greece and the United States, Turkey's latest five year DECA was approved in early 1988. However, as was the case with the Greek-United States DECA negotiations, Turkey tried to establish a link between the level of United States aid and the granting of basing rights in-country. Even though the United States continues its practice of not recognizing any formal relationship between the two, Turkey remains the third largest recipient of military assistance from the United States.³⁴ In return,

³³Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, "Turkey Comes to Terms With its Vulnerability," Jane's Defence Weekly, (2 July 1988), p. 1378.

³⁴"NATO's Southern Region," p. 3.

the 1988 DECA states that Turkey will provide the United States with installations and facilities in-country, which the United States ultimately uses to gather an estimated 25 percent of NATO's hard intelligence, much of which cannot be obtained from any other sources.³⁵

In-country basing rights remain a top priority in United States relations with Turkey:

Former NATO Supreme Commander, General Lyman Lemnitzer said there is no area in the world comparable to Turkey as a vital base of intelligence gathering operations against the Warsaw Pact.³⁶

The primary United States military facilities in Turkey: collect electronic and other types of intelligence from within the Soviet Union, around the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East; monitor Soviet space and missile systems development; and monitor nuclear activities and tests in the Soviet Union from a seismographic detection facility in central Turkey. As stated earlier, Turkey also maintains 16 NADGE stations, spread throughout Turkey, that provide early warning information for NATO.

The two most important United States facilities in Turkey are the intelligence sites located at Sinop and Diyarbakir. Sinop is located in north-central Turkey along the Black Sea coast and is operated by the United States

³⁵Kuniholm, p. 147.

³⁶Campany Jr., p. 57.

National Security Agency (NSA). The Sinop facility monitors Soviet communications, radar emissions, and missile testing activities in the Black Sea region. In southeastern Turkey, the Diyarbakir Air Station monitors Soviet missile tests and other Soviet military activities. Also of vital importance is the Incirlik Air Base, which plays host to United States Air Force fighter planes rotating from Italy and Spain. This is of special note because these planes "are the most forward deployed land-based U.S. tactical combat aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean."³⁷ In addition to these critical United States facilities, numerous other logistical and communication installations are located throughout Turkey.

In summary, both Greece and Turkey are geographically, militarily, and economically important, not only to the United States and NATO but increasingly to the Soviet Union as well. The region's vulnerability, primarily due to the bilateral dispute between Greece and Turkey, is a problem that requires an immediate solution. The future outlook for the entire region includes a strong United States presence and close military ties to both Greece and Turkey. Relations between Turkey and the United States are on the up-swing. Ties continue to grow stronger between these two allies, particularly since the 1988 DECA was approved. Greek-United States relations remain stressed however,

³⁷United States Congress, House, Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Installations, p. 49.

primarily due to problems encountered in the current DECA negotiations and the perception by the United States that anti-American sentiment is increasing in Greece.

With the background provided thus far, it is now necessary to study the model peace plan posed by the thesis problem statement in Chapter One. The stage is now set for Chapter Four's study of the Camp David Peace Accords.

CHAPTER 4

THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS

THE NEED FOR PEACE

The history of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict is very similar to the ongoing Greece-Turkey dispute in the sense that its history pre-dates the imposed time limitations of this study. The roots of this conflict can be traced back in time over 2,000 years, according to some scholars. However, it is unnecessary for the purpose of this thesis to examine the entire history of the conflict. Therefore, the study of the problems leading up to the need for peace between Egypt and Israel will begin with the early 1940s, just prior to the creation of the modern state of Israel.

Before examining the specific incidents and disputes that led up to the need for and execution of the Camp David Peace Accords (Accords), it is important to understand several key points. First is the use of the phrase "Arab-Israeli." Today, to many political scientists and scholars, the reference to Arab in this phrase often refers not only to the country of Egypt, but to several of its neighbors as well. This could include the nations of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as others (some will even include the Palestinians). These countries are called Arab because they "share a common culture and

speak Arabic as the primary language."¹ In the context of the Camp David Peace Accords and the purposes of this study, any reference to the phrase Arab-Israeli will describe Egypt exclusively.

The second important point, as the following history will clarify, is that the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved through several different types or forms of conflict prior to the signing of the Accords. To make the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict easier to understand, the following review will provide the reader with a general background of the evolution of the conflict from its origin in the 1930s up to the Camp David Summit in 1978.

There were three different types of Arab-Israeli conflicts identifiable. They were intercommunal conflict, interstate conflict and compound conflict. Initially the dispute could have been labeled as an intercommunal conflict exclusively. The definition for this type of dispute is that

contending communities engage in disputes within a formal centralized order where the authority and legitimacy of communal institutions surpasses that of the central government.²

Examples of intercommunal conflicts include riots,

¹David R. Tarr and Bryan R. Daves, ed., The Middle East, Sixth Edition (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1986), p. 9.

²Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg, ed., Superpower Involvement in the Middle East: Dynamics of Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), p. 266.

demonstrations and terrorism. In its infancy (prior to the declaration of independence for the Jewish State of Israel), the Arab-Israeli conflict centered around intercommunal disputes between the Jewish Palestinians and the Arab Palestinians.

[The establishment of the Jewish state [of Israel] transformed the conflict between Jews and Arab Palestinians into an interstate conflict between Israel and the Arab states.³

Unlike the intercommunal conflict, which was primarily restricted to the Palestinian communities, this interstate conflict involved sovereign nations crossing international boundaries and fighting a limited war against Israel. The interstate conflict also included the development of insurgencies orientated against the Jewish Palestinians. The final evolutionary step, the compound conflict, came after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The re-emergence of the Arab Palestinians as a community in the late 1960s and [early] 1970s again restructured the dispute along communal lines. At the same time, the reappearance of intercommunal conflict did not eliminate the interstate conflict.⁴

In the compound conflict, all types of actions took place, from minor street violence, to attacks by organized insurgents, ultimately escalating to national war. It was

³Ibid., pp. 266-267.

⁴Ibid., p. 267.

this state of conflict that characterized the Arab-Israeli situation from 1967 to 1978 when the Accords were signed.

The evolutionary pattern established as an overview of the type and kind of conflicts and the formation thereof leads to a study of the problems beginning in 1978. During the period 1930 up until 1948, the area currently known as Israel was referred to as Palestine. In 1920 the League of Nations mandated that the area of Palestine, an area that was west of the Jordan River, would be supervised by Great Britain. Palestine became the British Mandate of Palestine.

During the British Mandate period, which lasted for 25 years, a fight between the Arab and Jewish Palestinians broke out and developed into what has become known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The dispute centered on the issue of the increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine with their intent of establishing a separate Jewish State. The Arab Palestinians were unable successfully to counter the Jewish immigration, which accounted for a growing Jewish presence in Palestine, a presence that as previously stated sought its own independent homeland. The Arab Palestinians were unable to organize an effective counter largely because of internal clan rivalries among the larger more powerful Arab families. The continued growth of the Jewish community in Palestine soon led to a state of intercommunal conflict between the Jewish and Arab Palestinians.

In 1937, with tensions rising, the larger Arab community began to exert intense pressure on the British government in an effort to curb Jewish immigration and to demonstrate their strong desire to have the British presence dissolved in Palestine. Arab objections took place throughout Palestine, not only in the form of demonstrations and protests, but in armed assaults as well. In 1937 responding to the widespread violence, the British created the Royal Commission of Inquiry, also known as the Peel Commission. The purpose of the Commission was to investigate the hostile and acrimonious stance the Arab Palestinians had taken toward the Jewish Palestinians and the British themselves.

It was in this Commission's findings that is found the foundation for the creation of the State of Israel as well as the rudimentary cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The findings concluded that the British Mandate was doomed to failure because of the schism growing between the Arab and Jewish Palestinians. The Commission made the recommendation that the Mandate be divided into two separate nations, one Arab and one Jewish. The Jewish community welcomed the recommendation. The Arabs did not accept this finding, maintaining that all Palestine was Arab and that it should not be divided. The British were unable to bring about an end to the civil unrest and violence in Palestine until 1939. To appease the Arab Palestinians, the British enacted a new

immigration policy which became known as the White Paper of 1939. This new policy restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and remained in effect throughout World War II.

The document required

that Jewish immigration be curtailed, limiting it to 15,000 for 5 years, and none after that unless the Arabs accepted the immigrants. Then, after 10 years, an independent Palestinian state would be created with a guaranteed Arab majority. The White Paper also restricted Jews' purchase of land.⁵

Although this new policy significantly reduced the influx of Jews into Palestine, the Jewish Palestinians openly increased their opposition to the British Mandate by smuggling European Jews into Palestine throughout World War II and the period following the war's end. The White Paper's impact on Jewish immigration during the war years reduced immigrations by approximately 70,000 compared to the same time period prior to World War II.⁶

Within two years after the end of World War II, with opposition between the Arab and Jewish Palestinians on the rise, the British government made the decision to end the Mandate and to turn the Palestinian issue over to the United Nations for resolution. The United Nations promptly created the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to address the situation. In August 1947, the majority of

⁵Tarr, p. 8.

⁶Ibid., p. 21.

the 11 member UNSCOP, recommended to the United Nations General Assembly

that Palestine be divided into two states, one Arab the other Jewish, that they be joined in an economic federation, and the city of Jerusalem be administered under U.N. auspices.⁷

The plan also set aside specific land areas for the two new states to occupy, including the Gaza Strip (northeast of the Sinai Desert along the Mediterranean Sea) and the West Bank (area west of the Jordan River, including what is traditionally and historically considered Palestine, to include Jerusalem). As in 1937 with the British Peel Commission's recommendations, the Jewish community agreed to the proposal while the Arab community dissented.

The United Nations accepted the Commission's recommendation to partition Palestine with a formal vote of the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, believing that this action would resolve the Palestinian problem. Accompanying the vote, the British announced that the British Mandate of Palestine would expire on 14 May 1948, thus establishing a setting for the creation of two separate Palestinian states, one Jewish, one Arab.

Immediately following the United Nations vote, civil war broke out between the two factions of Palestinians. This violence was initiated by the Arab Palestinians who did not

⁷Ibid., p. 9.

want to see Palestine divided. The Arab Palestinians felt

that the U.N. had disregarded the rights of the Arab majority in Palestine by giving to the Palestinian Jews, then representing one third of the total population, more territory and resources than those allotted to the Arab state and by relegating well over 400,000 Arabs to minority status in the Jewish state.⁸

After initial successes, the Arab Palestinians became the targets of pre-emptive attacks by Jewish Palestinians. The Jewish attacks were very successful in gaining control of the areas that the United Nations had promised to them. On 14 May 1948, as Britain relinquished its Mandate, Jewish Palestinians declared the creation and independence of the nation of Israel. It was only moments after this declaration that the United States "became the first country to formally recognize the Jewish state. The Soviet Union followed quickly. Thus the stage was set for decades of superpower competition."⁹

Up to this point, the conflict had been fought between Arab and Jewish Palestinians. However, with the declaration of the creation of an independent State of Israel, the intercommunal conflict immediately grew into an interstate conflict, a war between nations. The day following the declaration, 15 May 1948, the armies of Egypt,

⁸Malcolm H. Kerr, ed., The Elusive Peace in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 22.

⁹Tarr, p. 37.

Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, all members of the Arab League, invaded Palestine. The goal of the Arab League was much the same as that of the Arab Palestinians: prevent the partitioning of Palestine. Although Israel was much smaller than the invaders it faced, it was able to defeat the Arabs in the War of 1948. The end of this campaign came on 7 January 1949, with Egypt signing an armistice agreement with Israel.

This Israeli victory was primarily due to the lack of unity of effort demonstrated and the combat inexperience of soldiers deployed by the Arab League. Unlike Israel which had one ultimate aim, the survival of Israel, the individual members of the Arab League in many ways fueled by their own interstate rivalries and objectives, were unable to maintain a cohesive force. National interests took priority over the common goal of defeating Israel. As the war progressed, Arab interest waned and concerns grew that neighboring Arab countries might gain undue advantages. From the military perspective, the Arab forces deployed armies that were vastly better equipped and manned than the Israeli's army; however, they were seriously deficient in combat experience. Only a small British led Jordanian Arab Legion had any World War II experience. On the other hand, the Israeli military had approximately 26,000 Palestinian Jews who had served in Europe during World War II with the Americans and British

gaining valuable combat experience.¹⁰ Another situation that further exacerbated the Arab problem was the time and distance factors affecting Arab liaison.

This lack of a unified, well trained Arab effort allowed the Israelis to shift forces quickly to defeat the Arab attacks. Ultimately Israel was able to expand its land holdings beyond the United Nations' partition plan boundaries, in the process seizing Arab Palestinian land. Only two regions remained under Arab control following the war. The West Bank came under the control of, and was later annexed by, King Abdullah of Jordan. The other territory, the Gaza Strip, came under the control of King Farouk of Egypt. The big losers of the 1948 War were the Palestinian Arabs who "not only lost the war but also disappeared entirely as a political entity.... In addition, many Palestinian Arabs were made refugees as a result of the war."¹¹ Following the war, nearly one million Arab Palestinian refugees had fled seeking temporary shelter in either Lebanon, Jordan, Syria or the Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt). The anger, hatred and bitterness of these displaced persons towards the Israelis with time spread a

¹⁰Robert O. Freedman, ed., World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 21.

¹¹Freedman, World Politics, p. 29.

negative influence throughout the region and thus fanned the flames of the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹²

A second significant result of the 1948 War was the reaction of the Arab community at large. The overwhelming defeat constituted a loss of honor and pride resulting in a lack of self-confidence. These Arab feelings manifested themselves in a desire for revenge and the growth of Arab nationalism.

Following the 1948 War, the Arabs continued their efforts to destroy Israel. The Arab League implemented a boycott against Israel and blockaded Israeli access to the Suez Canal and access through the Gulf of Aqaba in the northern Red Sea. The United Nations Security Council quickly responded to the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal by declaring the action illegal and ordering the canal re-opened to Israeli shipping traffic immediately. Egypt refused while continuing its boycott of Israeli products. It was also at this time that Egypt began training Arab Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Intentions were to provide an effective force to raid Israel.

The year 1956 brought with it an effort to break Egypt's nationalization of what had been the British run Suez Canal. Israel allied itself with Britain and France in an operation aimed at re-opening the canal. Britain and France

¹²Kerr, p. 24.

maintained an interest because they owned the majority of stock in the Suez Canal Company, the organization that ran the canal. The plan called for a combined, offensive, military operation against Egypt. The focus of the operation was the exertion of enough pressure on Egypt to end the Egyptian enforced blockade. "On October 29, Israel... Invaded the Sinai Peninsula, ostensibly to discourage, if not end, Arab sniping and raids along the Gaza border."¹³ Two days later the British and French struck Egyptian military targets with air strikes which resulted in Egypt sinking ships in the Suez Canal to block it. Because of the outcries from the United Nations, the hostilities halted quickly and withdrawal of all British, French, and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory resulted by March of 1957.

Also in March 1957, in response to the conflict, the United Nations created the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The UNEF was created and deployed at Egyptian-Israeli borders along the Gaza Strip and along the Sinai to keep future hostilities from erupting. One key factor in their deployment, however, was that no forces were to be stationed on Egyptian soil because of the Israeli refusal to allow the force on its territory. This stationing had

¹³John H. Davis, The Evasive Peace: A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem (London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1968), p. 46.

far-reaching impact, because in 1967 the Egyptians unilaterally demanded that the UNEF be removed.

The period 1956-1967, later termed the Interwar Years, was characterized by a growing arms race between Egypt and Israel as well as a period of relative calm along the borders (because of the UNEF presence). This calm was broken in 1965-1966 by increased friction and attacks against Israel by a Palestinian Arab group known as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This time frame was followed by a period of increased incidents between Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors. The tension mounted while the Egyptians continued the blockade of Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. It took little time for the confusion to develop into the 1967 War.

The 1967 War began shortly after President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of Egypt, believing that the Israelis were preparing to attack Egypt, placed Egyptian military forces in the Sinai Desert on alert. This was followed by Egypt asking the United Nations to remove the UNEF from its positions in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The basis for these decisions by President Nasser was intelligence provided Egypt by the Soviet Union. As of 19 May 1967, the UNEF had completed its mission and was no longer an active peacekeeping force separating the Egyptians and Israelis. This force had been in place in response to Israeli requests to stop Arab raids from the Gaza Strip into

Israel, and in response to the tensions created by the Egyptian blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In addition to taking those actions, the Egyptians signed a joint defense agreement with Jordan, which resulted in troop movements between these two countries and along their borders. Once again the basis for these decisions by President Nasser was intelligence provided Egypt by the Soviets, claiming indications of a forthcoming Israeli attack on Egypt. Unfortunately for Egypt, the Soviet intelligence concerning an Israeli build-up was wrong. On the other side, Israeli intelligence observed the Arab troop build-ups taking place in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and noted too the removal by Egyptian request, of the UNEF. Fearing a combined attack from these Arab countries, Israel made the decision to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the Arabs on 5 June 1967.

The 1967 War lasted for six days and resulted in a defeat of the Arab countries, much like the 1948 War for Israeli independence and for many of the same reasons. The key to victory was once again a unified resolve by Israel against the individualistic Arab nations. "On 10 June 1967, the day the cease-fire took effect, Israel held three times as much territory as it had six days earlier."¹⁴ The defeat of Egypt, to include the loss of both the Sinai and the Gaza

¹⁴Kerr, p. 138.

Strip humiliated the Egyptians. To the north, Syria lost land as well. The Israelis captured the Golan Heights in response to the continued use of that area by the Syrians as a base to stage attacks into Israel's northeastern settlements. Jordan also lost, as Israel took control of the West Bank. Arab pride had been insulted for the second time as their combined forces fell in defeat. A high point for the Israelis was the unification of Jerusalem, which occurred with Israel's seizure of the West Bank. Another important aspect of the Six Day War was the origin of an all-out arms race between Egypt and Israel, accompanied and supported by a superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arab states became closely aligned with the Soviet Union while Israel drew closer ties to the United States. Each superpower began supplying its protege with arms and aid.

An uneasy state of peace followed the 1967 War, and it lasted only a short time before hostilities exploded on the scene again between Israel and Egypt. In 1969 the two countries engaged in sporadic fighting along the Suez Canal. These skirmishes continued and developed into an Egyptian war of attrition against Israel that lasted until 1973. The war of attrition "attempted to wear down the Israelis and bring about [Israeli] territorial withdrawals"¹⁵ from the Suez

¹⁵Tarr, p. 45.

region. Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency of Egypt on 30 September 1979 at the death of President Nasser. He found the war of attrition floundering and was forced to prepare Egypt for another full scale war with Israel, this time on Egyptian terms.

President Sadat initiated and solidified an Arab coalition prepared to go to war against Israel. Israel, on the other hand, failed to "appreciate the Arab need -- especially Egypt's -- to restore their honor lost on the battlefield"¹⁶ in 1967 and did not prepare for the upcoming war. Some scholars submit that Israeli intelligence knew of the Arab build-up and intentionally took no pre-emptive action as had been their practice earlier, because of fears that the reaction, by the United States and other western countries would be to condemn yet another Israeli "first strike."

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. President Hafez al Assad of Syria worked with President Sadat in planning the attack and readily committed Syria's military force to the battle. King Hussein of Jordan declined to assist in the planning of the attack and also refused to allow Jordanian military forces to attack Israel. What King Hussein did do, however, was to build-up his military forces along the border in an effort to deceive the Israelis into

¹⁶Kerr, p. 145.

believing Jordan's military would have a role in the attack. President Sadat's objective was to "keep Israel focused on three fronts and unable to switch attention from one front to another, as it had done in defeating the Arabs in 1948 and 1967."¹⁷

Initial Egyptian efforts into Israeli-occupied territory were successful as the unprepared Israeli forces were pushed east. Five Egyptian divisions crossed the Suez Canal before Israel was able to counterattack and break through the Egyptian lines. The Israeli forces were able to penetrate beyond the Suez Canal's west bank before halting on Egyptian soil. On the Syrian front, Israel pushed Syrian forces back to within 20 kilometers (km) of Syria's capital city of Damascus. Both Jordan and Iraq had come to Syria's aid in the last days of fighting to stay the Israeli retaliation. This effort failed. The United Nations quickly drafted Resolution 338, which was able to establish a cease-fire ending the October 1973 War. The war had, however,

brought home the realization of the urgency of finding a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict which had, overnight, become a threat to the economy as well as the security of the world.¹⁸

¹⁷Tarr, p. 13.

¹⁸Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, The Camp David Accords: A Testimony (London: KPI Limited, 1986), p. 10.

Soon after the end of the war, United States-Egyptian relations were revived. The relationship had been terminated after the 1967 War by President Nasser in protest to the role that the United States played in re-supplying Israel during the war. The renewed relationship soon became the fodder for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy efforts. As President Richard M. Nixon's peace envoy, Secretary Kissinger traveled between Egypt and Israel, trying to bring a lasting peace to the two combatants.

The first result of this was the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, which President Sadat concluded without consulting with the other Arab nations, or even with Syria, Egypt's ally and partner in the 1973 War.¹⁹

The second significant event was a visit by President Nixon to Egypt, accompanied by the resumption of United States aid to the country.

The period between 1974 and 1978 was characterized by a world movement to bring peace to the Middle East. This included the publication of a joint communique by the United States and the Soviet Union on 1 October 1977. The communique

called for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by resolving such key issues as the withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the 1967

¹⁹Ibid., p. 11.

conflict; [and] the resolution of the
Palestinian question.²⁰

The Joint superpower effort met with limited results as both Egypt and Israel battled growing domestic problems. During this final year before Camp David, President Sadat's popularity declined. It was felt he needed to make "progress in three areas: economic improvements, upgrading of the military, and progress towards a Middle East peace settlement"²¹ to continue his presidency. Egypt's severe economic problems included high inflation, high population growth, debt payment difficulties, large external debt incurrence and high subsidies on domestic basic goods.²² At this time Israel was also experiencing economic problems, primarily credited to their tremendous amount of defense expenditures. Both countries had finally come to the realization that in order to resolve their deteriorating economic and domestic political problems a lasting peace would have to be developed and implemented. The time for President Jimmy Carter's Camp David approach had arrived.

To summarize the problems dividing Egypt and Israel, excerpts of a speech to Congress on 18 September 1978 by

²⁰William B. Quandt, ed., The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 393-394.

²¹United States Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Middle East at the Crossroads, Report, (9 November 1977), p. 20.

²²Ibid., p. 23.

President Carter follow:

Through the long years of conflict, four main issues have divided the parties. One is the nature of peace -- whether peace will mean simply that the guns are silenced, the bombs stop falling...or whether it will mean that the nations of the Middle East can deal with each other as neighbors and equals, with the full range of diplomatic, cultural, economic and human relations between them.

...The second main issue is providing for the security of all the parties involved, including Israel, so that none of them need fear attack or military threats from any other.

...Third is the question of an agreement on secure and recognized boundaries, the end of military occupation, and the granting of self-government or return to other nations of territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 conflict.

...And finally, there is the painful human question of the fate of the Palestinians who live or who have lived in this disputed region.²³

THE PEACE PROCESS AND FRAMEWORK

If there is a monument to the Camp David Accords, it is surely the peace between Egypt and Israel. With all its imperfections, it has lasted for ten years. And while it has not led to a wider peace, and it did not prevent the war in Lebanon, it has ensured that no full-scale Arab-Israeli conflict could take place similar to that of October 1973.²⁴

²³John L. Moore, ed., President Carter 1978 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1979), p. 154A.

²⁴Quandt, The Middle East, p. 15.

With domestic and international pressures for peace on the rise, both Egypt and Israel began to consider peace as a solution to their antagonistic relationship; but, before the Accords can be examined, the period prior to 1978 with its peace efforts must be scrutinized.

The interim years following the 1973 War and preceding the 1978 Accords were characterized by a step-by-step peace strategy orchestrated by the United States. Both Presidents Nixon and Ford pressed forward with this escalating design, utilizing Secretary of State Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" to obtain results. The first fruits to be born from these efforts resulted from a meeting of President Sadat and Secretary Kissinger. From this meeting emerged a cease-fire agreement which Egypt and Israel signed on 11 November 1973. This document was of special significance because it was the first signed by both countries since the Armistice in 1949 ending the Israeli War of Independence.

Another successful round of negotiations soon took place with Secretary Kissinger in the lead. Meeting in December 1973 at the Geneva Conference on Arab-Israeli Peace, Egypt and Israel ended the conference "with an agreement to begin talks on separating Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal."²⁵ The Suez Canal Disengagement Agreement

²⁵Tarr, p. 47.

was signed in January, resulting in Israeli troop withdrawals from both sides of the Suez Canal by 4 March 1974. What followed this period of successes was a time of turmoil and uncertainty in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Secretary Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy stalled as efforts failed to bring about a disengagement in the Sinai Desert.

Although United States-Egyptian diplomatic relations were fully resumed on 28 February 1974, and the Suez Canal was re-opened in June 1975 to commercial shipping, the next big negotiation breakthrough did not take place until 1 September 1975. "[A]fter another exhaustive period of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, a second disengagement agreement was signed by Israel and Egypt."²⁶ The Sinai II Agreements called for the Israeli withdrawal from Egypt's Abu Rudels oil fields and the Sinai Desert mountain passes (the Giddi and the Mitla) that lay 30 km from the Suez Canal and that access the eastern desert to the western desert. A major point of the agreement was that President Gerald Ford agreed to station United States technicians in a Sinai buffer zone. As a monitoring force, this was the first time that American soldiers were in the conflict zone.

Once again this period of accomplishment was followed with a time of widening disputes over Israeli withdrawal issues. Also of growing concern was Egypt's domestic

²⁶Freedman, World Politics, p. 101.

economic picture and its falling international political situation with the other Arab nations.

The leaders of Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians feared that a separate Egyptian-Israeli Accord would leave the Arab side so weak that it could never negotiate successfully with Israel, or mount a credible military threat.²⁷

In addition to Egypt's problems, Israeli relations with other Arab countries deteriorated, adding another distractor to the peace process.

With the election of President Carter in 1977, the Kissinger step-by-step shuttle diplomacy was grounded and thrown aside. President Carter, with his new Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, proceeded with a new design for the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. A comprehensive peace settlement became the administration's objective. President Carter had recognized that the step-by-step approach, used so successfully at times, had limitations. Its primary weakness was that the system could not resolve deep rooted problems, such as the Palestinian refugee issue.

Initial attempts under President Carter were to call for a new Geneva Peace Conference to conclude a comprehensive peace. This approach had been designed during the Nixon Administration. Its key elements included that the conference would operate under United Nations auspices and

²⁷William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 329.

that it would "be headed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union, with participation by the Israelis and their Arab neighbors -- and the Palestinians."²⁸ Initially, President Carter was able to gain agreement from Egypt and Israel on his principles for the new peace negotiations. These principles included: the peace be a comprehensive one; a general outline for the desired settlement be worked out in advance; the peace process be kept "in the news" and high on the priority list for the United States; and finally, the Soviet Union be actively involved in the peace process - a principle that was not used in the Camp David Accords but was primarily designed to play a part in the Geneva Conference process.

Between July and November 1977, President Carter had meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat. These meetings were to prepare for a Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. By 9 November 1977, both Israel and Egypt had accepted President Carter's plan to convene the Geneva Peace Conference. Shortly thereafter, dissatisfied with President Carter's Geneva approach, President Sadat on invitation from Prime Minister Begin made his famous trip to Jerusalem to speak to the Israeli Knesset (parliament). During his 20 November 1977 speech, in addition to calling for a comprehensive Egyptian-Israeli

²⁸Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 279.

peace, President Sadat recognized the State of Israel, becoming the first Arab nation in Israel's history to recognize the Jewish state. President Sadat's visit was an immense emotional break-through for Egyptian-Israeli relations; but, just as important, it stalled the Geneva Peace Conference process. Had President Carter's Geneva Conference taken place,

Sadat's hands would have been tied by the participation in the conference of the USSR, with which he had seriously damaged his relation, and by the active role of Syria and Jordan, as well as by the influence the PLO would have had on the conference.²⁹

The first hurdle to peace had been cleared. Both nations clearly understood that the other wanted to negotiate a peace settlement. President Sadat's actions had brought about a new awareness and a change in attitude of both the Egyptians and the Israelis. In a follow-up attempt, President Sadat invited all parties to a pre-Geneva conference in Cairo. The Cairo Conference took place in mid-December 1977, attended only by the host nation, Israel, the United States and a United Nations representative. Attempting to establish procedures for reconvening the peace talks, the conference failed to produce any significant results. A major failure of the Cairo Conference was that, although sponsored by President Sadat, it was unable to draw the other involved Arab entities into the peace discussions.

²⁹Quandt, The Middle East, pp. 394-395.

Following the Cairo Conference, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin met in Ismailia, Egypt, to exchange a draft declaration of negotiating principles. At the end of the two-day meeting, neither country's proposal had been accepted. In an effort to maintain the momentum towards peace, two ministerial level committees were established to pursue an agreement on the negotiating principles. "A Military Committee was to discuss the problems of the Sinai, while a Political Committee was to seek agreement on"30 the declaration of principles.

This was a short-lived effort as tensions and anger grew on both sides over the disputed issues. The Political Committee was terminated after its first meeting because of disagreements over new Israeli settlements in the Sinai and Arab criticism of President Sadat. With this January 1978 break-down in talks, Egyptian threats of resumption of force were met with Israeli assertions that no further withdrawals would take place and that Jewish settlements in the occupied zones would not be abandoned. The United States endeavored to break the deadlock in negotiation with a near-continuous series of meetings involving senior government officials of Egypt, Israel and the United States itself. In many ways it appeared that President Carter had turned the clock back to

30Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 295.

Secretary Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy when Secretary of State Vance and Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton made numerous trips between the two disputants. These trips and other United States efforts showed a lack of satisfactory progress while tensions continued to rise. In August 1978, the United Nations force in the Sinai was quickly approaching its termination date. These factors combined to motivate President Carter to call for the Camp David Summit. The meeting was held from 5 September to 17 September 1978 in the seclusion of Camp David, Maryland. The Summit's negotiations and proceedings were conducted away from the public view in secrecy "insulated from the mass media and from domestic political pressures"³¹ to help the leadership involved focus on solutions to the issues at hand.

The Summit was a meeting that brought together three world leaders and their negotiating staffs. The key players were President Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin. In reference to the negotiations it was said, "The cards one is dealt do matter, but so does the talent of the player."³² This notion that leadership plays a key role in negotiations has never been more emphatic than was the case with the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. The leadership, skill, dynamism, timing, and strategic perspective that the

³¹Touval, p. 299.

³²Quandt, Camp David, p. 332.

three leaders brought to the Summit played a critical role in achieving the success of Camp David.

President Sadat had established himself as a president for the people and, although his popularity waned, he still maintained strong enough support from the people of Egypt to pursue his commitment for peace. "Egypt, under Sadat's leadership, was not prepared to sacrifice its own national interests for the sake of the other Arabs."³³ In this light, after the many meetings with President Carter, President Sadat was convinced that peace with Israel was not only necessary and desirable, but it was achievable as well, and that the United States had to be actively involved in the process.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin was an equally popular and capable leader, who like President Sadat was considered a hero by his countrymen. Because of the domestic problems Israel was fighting, Prime Minister Begin, like President Sadat, needed a victory at Camp David. In short, the people of Israel and Egypt expected an equitable peace to be the result of the Camp David Summit.

The final member of this tripartite was President Carter. Unlike his predecessor, President Carter placed a very high priority on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli crisis. Mediation under President Carter

³³Ibid., p. 331.

differed from previous attempts in that Egypt and Israel maintained direct communication in addition to the contacts they had through the mediator [the United States]; moreover, the president of the U.S. was personally and intensively involved in the negotiations, much more than any previous president.³⁴

As the mediator for the Camp David Summit, President Carter set the agenda and, therefore, controlled the progress of the talks. The four items on the agenda that all three parties wanted discussed were: normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations, recognized borders and security zones, security for Israel, and the Palestinian issue.

A problem experienced early on at the Summit that seriously affected the proceedings was that two of the three key participants could not negotiate face-to-face. President Sadat's and Prime Minister Begin's conflict placed a heavier mediation burden on the United States than President Carter had envisioned. A system of separate meetings for the two leaders was adopted; whereby, the two parties consulted separately with President Carter and thus were able to explore new ideas. The second step of this innovative approach was for President Carter to relay those ideas between the other two parties. The final sequence of the procedure was to produce workable drafts of the proposals that formed a median position between the two. President Carter had assumed two roles: one, the mediator and two, the

³⁴Touval, p. 285.

courier. The most significant progress in the negotiations was made during these separate meetings that the United States representatives had with the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators. It is important to note that bilateral meetings between Egypt and Israel also took place, these without any United States representation.

As with any system, flaws became evident. The dual lines of communication sometimes led to inconsistency and misperceptions as information from multiple sources was not the same. Another shortcoming was that the United States negotiators were not completely, if at all, informed of the content of the bilateral talks held with the United States absent. "Although both sides kept the U.S. routinely informed of their talks, bilateral talks without American presence probably impaired"35 the American mediation effort. This problem was partially solved at Camp David because of President Carter's role in setting the agenda and establishing the negotiating procedures.

The negotiations were aimed at resolving "longstanding disputes that had been perpetuated by years of hostility and to give up positions they considered essential to their national interests."36 By applying situational pressure and by offering broad incentives, President Carter

35Ibid., p. 305.

36Tarr, p. 50.

succeeded in overcoming the disputes and in producing the Camp David Accords. Two days into the Summit, it became obvious to President Carter that pressure would have to be applied to gain positive resolves. One such pressure employed by President Carter was the establishment of a deadline to the talks. This forced the Egyptians and Israelis to start making concessions towards the accomplishment of the peace plan.

"More important than the pressures were the incentives offered to the parties and the compensation given them for the concessions they made."³⁷ The Egyptians were promised that if an agreement was reached with Israel the United States would provide massive amounts of economic and military aid. The Israelis could expect their current programs to continue under United States funding. Additionally, President Carter agreed to pay the cost of constructing two Israeli airfields in the Negev Desert, to replace the air bases at Etzion and Etam in the Sinai that the Israelis agreed to relinquish. Another incentive to both countries was that President Carter guaranteed the peace treaty's solidarity by backing it with the threat of future United States involvement to "take] action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the

³⁷Touval, p. 326.

treaty."³⁸ In the end, President Carter realized that the United States also had something at risk by involving itself in the negotiations, its reputation and credibility.

With these pressures and incentives pushing the leaders toward peace, an agreement was finally reached. On 17 September 1978, the three nations signed two peace agreements known as the Camp David Peace Accords (see Appendix A). While not a peace treaty, the Accords did resolve key issues and, more importantly, provided a framework with which to complete a final treaty of peace. The two agreements were titled: "A Framework For Peace In The Middle East" and "Framework For An Egyptian-Israeli Treaty."

The first agreement "A Framework For Peace In The Middle East," was a guide for future peace treaties within the Middle East. Its provisions included: 1) a three stage plan for resolving the Palestinian problem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 2) a resolution not to use force as a means to solve Arab-Israeli disputes; 3) the goal of completing an Arab-Israeli peace treaty in three months or less; and 4) associated principles required for future peace treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbors (i.e. full recognition of Israel, lifting of boycotts, normal peacetime relations,

³⁸Ibid., p. 318.

United States participation and United Nations endorsement and guarantee).

The companion agreement, "Framework For An Egyptian-Israeli Treaty," although redundant in some ways, dealt more with the security and military aspects of the conflict. It called for: 1) completing an Arab-Israeli peace treaty within three months; 2) Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Desert, including the more than 70 Israeli settlements that had been established in the occupied territories³⁹; 3) the Israeli right to transit the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; 4) stationing less than one Egyptian division east of the Suez Canal; 5) stationing less than four Israeli brigades along the international border; 6) stationing a United Nations Force along the international border and at the Strait of Tiran, which can be removed only by a unanimous vote of the United Nations Security Council; and 7) establishment of full diplomatic relations after the interim troop withdrawals are made (3-9 months after signing the peace treaty).

Although these two agreements spoke of all four issues that President Carter and the other two national leaders had agreed to discuss, several key disputes went unresolved by the Accords and were deferred for future negotiations. "[T]wo fundamental questions on which the

³⁹United States Congress, House, International Relations, The Middle East, p. 18.

parties were divided were the...West Bank and Gaza and the claim for Palestine self-determination."⁴⁰

Israel non-concurred with the recommendation to establish a new Palestinian state because of the anti-Israeli ideology espoused by some Palestinians and the proximity that the new state would have to Israel. Both threatened Israeli security. However, the United States was able to overcome this dispute by deferring its resolution and providing for a five year transitional period, the end of which would see the issue re-addressed and resolved.

The treatment/division of Jerusalem was another issue that the Accords left to be resolved at a later date. Because Israel had seized the Arab portion of Jerusalem during the 1967 War, it non-concurred with Egypt's position that the city be granted the same five year transitional period as the West Bank. No agreement could be reached on this issue in the Accords so each nation's follow-up position was to be appended later.

Even with these issues left unresolved and deferred, it is important to note that few politicians thought that the Arab-Israeli conflict could be settled by one treaty. As the first step, the Camp David Accords resolved many of the disputed issues and provided an agreement for the signing of a peace treaty approximately three months after signing the

⁴⁰Touval, p. 308.

Accords. As the Honorable Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State reported, the Camp David Accords

lay a foundation for a comprehensive settlement. The outcome at Camp David, therefore, is a major step toward a phased, cumulative set of agreements through which a record of success and confidence can be compiled and on which further -- and at some point ultimate -- decisions can be reached to achieve a final accord.⁴¹

In studying the Accords several lessons learned become important to understand when viewing the agreements. "First, the formula for the deal was asymmetric. One side of the equation was made up of substantive concessions and the second was composed on probabilities."⁴² The second lesson is that, even with mediation by the United States, the two protagonists had to assume major roles and responsibilities for the negotiations to succeed. Next, based on historical precedence and the longstanding nature of the disputes to be resolved, without United States mediation the talks would have failed or at best have had limited success. The fourth lesson learned was that successful mediation by the United States demanded the full attention and participation of the President of the United States and his Secretary of State. Person -- of a lesser stature in government would not have had

⁴¹United States Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Assessment of the 1978 Middle East Camp David Agreements, Hearing, (28 September 1978), p. 8.

⁴²Shlomo Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 287.

the credibility needed to mediate the negotiations. The next lesson was that acting as mediator required a strategic perspective and outlook. The negotiations were "much more involved than simply encouraging reluctant parties to talk to one another."⁴³ The sixth lesson was that timing was critical to successful talks and that power was essential to mediate agreements. The mediator's power was used to pressure and induce the disputants into granting concessions and reaching agreements. These are the most valuable lessons the United States learned as mediator of the Accords and should be considered in future endeavors.

The final segment of the Accord's framework to be addressed are the principles used by the United States while acting as mediator at the Camp David Summit. In preparation of the Summit, President Carter and his staff formulated the following list of principles to guide the United States' mediation efforts and the negotiations as a whole. These principles were:

The need to preserve our special military and economic relationships with [both countries].

The urgency of flexibility by all the parties, if any lasting settlement [was] to be reached.

The importance of having the parties refrain from any unilateral action which might be interpreted as prejudging the outcome of the negotiations.

⁴³Quandt, Camp David, p. 336.

The willingness to offer binding, long-term guarantees or other defense arrangements if desired by the parties and essential to peace.

The need to stress to all the parties that the United States will not and cannot, even if it so chose, impose a lasting peace settlement on any party.

The desirability of encouraging... [the] states to work together in the search for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.⁴⁴

These principles led the United States mediation efforts at Camp David, ultimately forming the framework for the peace process and the Camp David Accords themselves. In the final analysis, the Accords have brought peace to Egypt and Israel and have provided a foundation from which future peace negotiations may lead to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

PRICE OF PEACE

The cost of the Camp David Accords to the United States was high. The price tag was not only an economic issue, but it included political and human costs as well. A review of each of these three cost categories reveals how much the United States was willing to give in order to succeed in bringing peace to Egypt and Israel.

Beginning with the Sinai II Agreement, the United States paid substantial revenues in aid and political concessions to Israel in return for approval of the

⁴⁴United States Congress, House, International Relations, The Middle East, pp. 3-4.

agreement. Speculation even then was taking place, questioning how long the United States could continue paying such a high price for successes in the Middle East.⁴⁵ The Accords continued the legacy of peace at a high price. During the Camp David Summit both Egypt and Israel were led to believe, and assumed, that each would receive large quantities of economic and military assistance if an agreement was reached. One project that fell in this economic category for the United States was the removal of Israeli forces in the Sinai Desert.

Israeli officials estimated that moving its military forces from the Sinai Peninsula to the Negev Desert in southern Israel would cost approximately \$3 billion over three years.⁴⁶

This economic cost to the United States has continued to escalate since the signing of the Accords. Both Egypt and Israel continue to receive United States economic and military aid in addition to the cost incurred by financing one-third of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Force on peacekeeping duty in the Sinai Desert. The United States supports the MFO because of a prior agreement with Egypt and Israel to help defer the cost. The United States' cost of supporting the MFO in fiscal year (FY) 1987 was in excess of \$24 million.

⁴⁵Freedman, World Politics, p. 44.

⁴⁶Tarr, p. 52.

In the area of economic support for Egypt and Israel, the United States continues to provide large sums of all-grant Economic Support Fund (ESF) monies to both countries. In Egypt's case, the United States is trying to help build a stronger economy and also reduce the amount of external debt that the country is responsible to repay. Egypt's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) debt alone was \$2.02 billion at the end of FY 1987. To help off-set the debt and build the economy, \$819 million in ESF monies were granted to Egypt in FY 1987.⁴⁷

In Israel's case, the United States economic support is critical to off-set their continued high spending levels on defense and other military expenditures. In 1988 these expenditures accounted for 18% of Israel's Gross National Product (GNP).⁴⁸ At the end of FY 1987, Israel's FMS debt was \$8.45 billion. The debt and struggling economy were reasons why Israel was granted \$1.2 billion in ESF monies in FY 1987.⁴⁹

In military support, Egypt received \$1.3 billion in forgiven funds in FY 1987, compared to the \$1.8 billion that Israel received. Egypt's FMS programs continue to stress upgrading its force while Israel's programs are designed to

⁴⁷United States Congress, Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs Fiscal Year 1989, p. 138.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 194.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 197.

maintain the qualitative edge of the Israeli military. Total economic and military assistance programs in FY 1987 totaled in excess of \$2 billion for Egypt and \$3 billion for Israel. The economic cost of the Accords to the United States remains high and is still a burden.

The second cost the United States incurred because of the Accords was a political one. The first political cost was required because "both sides were aware that they could not settle their conflict without American guarantees that the agreement they reached would be honored."⁵⁰ Therefore, President Carter's guarantees to insure treaty compliance was a price paid by the United States. The second political cost was the lack of Arab support for the Egyptians and the Accords; and the resulting growth of isolation experienced by Egypt as its Arab neighbors broke diplomatic ties in protest. The third and final political cost was the growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East after the signing of the Accords. The Soviet Union took advantage of the break in Arab relations to "continue its efforts to build an anti-imperialist bloc of Arab States."⁵¹

The final cost of the Accords, which has yet to be paid, is the human cost. Since the Israeli seizure of the occupied territories in 1967, the Arab nations have fought

⁵⁰Touval, p. 304.

⁵¹Freedman, World Politics, p. 270.

loudly for Arab Palestinian rights to self determination and autonomy. However,

[t]he record of the Arab nations themselves toward the Palestinians left much to be desired. Before 1967, when Egypt occupied Gaza, and Jordan the West Bank, there had been no move on the part of either country to grant autonomy to the Palestinians.⁵²

This issue remains largely unresolved. The Palestinian question is one cost of the Camp David Accords that has yet to be paid.

The Camp David Accords answered a cry for peace. The process and framework that make up the Accords, adjusted to the situation and the conflict. The element that set the Accords apart from other peace plans was its success.

"Moreover, the Camp David framework [had left] the necessary room for negotiations"⁵³ to resolve the issues not completely addressed by the Accords. Camp David had provided a successful first step in bringing peace to Egypt and Israel.

As of 1989, the decade of peace between Egypt and Israel is a fact. The future, however, remains questionable and depends on the continued cooperation and goodwill of the two countries.

⁵²Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 276-277.

⁵³United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Situation in Lebanon: U.S. Role in the Middle East, Hearing, (9 September 1982), p. 5.

CHAPTER 5

CAMP DAVID - A MODEL FOR PEACE

INTEGRATION OF THE MODEL

To satisfy the scope of this thesis it is not necessary nor pertinent to present a detailed analysis of the current Egyptian-Israeli situation. As delineated in Chapter Four, the decade of peace ensuing between Egypt and Israel attests to the success of the Camp David Peace Accords. The final phase of study applies the successful Camp David peace process to the current Greek-Turkish dispute. To achieve an objective conclusion, analysis is founded on the Accords' basic approach and thrusts the Greek-Turkish issue into the same perspective and format as the previously addressed Egyptian-Israeli dilemma.

As explained in Chapter Four, the Accords addressed and resolved three categories of issues: the individual country's need for national security, territorial claims, and economics. These three encompassed all the disputed issues between Egypt and Israel. Even a cursory review of the issues dividing Greece and Turkey indicates that they too fall under one of these main categories and are also in need of forward momentum towards resolution.

Beginning in the area of national security, the following Greek-Turkish disagreements are addressed: Greek militarization of Aegean Islands, Aegean air space and

air traffic control, Aegean territorial water limits, and the Cyprus affair. The category of territorial control encompasses these issues: the Aegean territorial water limits to include the continental shelf, Aegean air space control, and the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. The final category, economics, includes the Aegean continental shelf, Aegean territorial water limits, Aegean air traffic control, and Cyprus.

The study parallels and describes the similarities between the Greek-Turkish issues and the Egyptian-Israeli embroilment. The similarities are many and flow in the same sequence as the previous three chapters of this study. "Areas of dispute" are presented first and parallel Chapter Two of the thesis, concentrating on the Cyprus issue. The lack of a comprehensive issue by issue review and the accompanying emphasis on the Cyprus issue does not compromise the validity of this study. It does, however, focus research and analysis on the principle issue that forms the heart of the Greek-Turkish dispute, Cyprus. (Reminder: the purpose of this study is not to develop a comprehensive peace plan for the Greece-Turkey conflict but to explore the feasibility of using the Camp David Accords as a "role model" for the development of such an all encompassing peace plan.)

The second grouping of similarities falls under the heading of "regional importance" and parallels the subdivisions of Chapter Three. Specific areas addressed

include Soviet influence, the vulnerability of NATO, and United States relations with Greece and Turkey. The final group of similarities under the "peace process" heading parallel Chapter Four of this study. This section focuses on the peace process and negotiations and introduces the discussion in the next section of this chapter; namely, the various mediation efforts taken to resolve the Greek-Turkish problems. As a reminder, the method used to integrate the Camp David model with today's conflict, will focus primarily on the similarities that exist between these two cases.

For the first comparison, it is important to recognize the relationship created because of the close physical proximity of the Israelis and the Arab Palestinians. Because of this closeness, "with or without a formal agreement, they [were] fated to live with one another."¹ This is the same situation facing Greece and Turkey today. As discussed in Chapter Two, these two countries not only share an international border, but they are also co-partners in the ownership and responsibility for the Aegean Sea with its benefits and burdens. The situation remains that with or without peace Greece and Turkey are fated to continue living as neighbors.

The situation following the creation of the state of Israel reveals many similarities between the Arab

¹William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 333.

Palestinians and the Cypriots today. The Palestinian refugee problem was "a tragic by-product of the creation of the State of Israel,"² and it remains the dominant unresolved issue that Israel faces today. The War of 1948 left many Palestinians as refugees, homeless and without their land and many of their possessions. Because of the war, tens of thousands of people fled Palestine in a mass exodus of fear. "They were not compensated for the abandoned property, which the governments simply seized in many cases."³ Both the refugee issue and its related property compensation question are problems facing Cyprus currently. As described in Chapter Two, the Greek backed military coup d' etat and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 left thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees. Many from both Cypriot communities were coerced or forced to abandon their homes and properties. They remain dislocated and uncompensated for their losses to this day.

Another aspect of the Cyprus problem similar to that experienced by the Palestinian refugees is the manner in which the United Nations became involved. In its initial dealings and peace efforts, the United Nations failed

²John H. Davis, The Evasive Peace: A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem (London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1968), p. 53.

³David R. Tarr and Bryan R. Daves, ed., The Middle East, Sixth Edition (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1986), p. 18.

to recognize the nationalistic feelings the Palestinians had and dealt with them simply as refugees. This is the same problem that Cyprus faces today. Following the 1974 invasion and partitioning of Cyprus, the United Nations' mediation efforts neglected to recognize the nationalistic feelings held by the Cypriots. The two Cypriot communities want to be treated as national entities or as a single nation, not as displaced Greek or Turkish Cypriots. In both the Palestinian and Cypriot cases, the failure to recognize the nationalistic movements early on in the mediation caused considerable time to elapse before effective negotiations could begin.

The next group of similarities fall under the heading of regional importance. As described in Chapters Three and Four, Soviet efforts to influence events and national dispositions have characterized both the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Greek-Turkish conflict.

The Soviets in their early support for the creation of the Jewish state seemed to be motivated by a number of factors. First, the Yishuv, the Jewish settlement in Palestine, was actively opposing the British Mandate and therefore opposing one of the major imperial powers.⁴

A second factor that the Soviets felt assisted their efforts, was the fact that the Yishuv leadership were predominately socialist. This, the Soviets thought, made the Jewish

⁴Tarr, p. 39.

Palestinians "more willing than the British to cooperate with the USSR."⁵

A direct correlation exists between these two factors and the situation that exists today in Greece. Because Greece is more willing than Turkey to establish close contacts with the Soviet Union, expectations are that the Soviet emphasis on Soviet-Greek relations will continue. Thus, a parallel exists between the Yishuv's opposition to the British during the early 1940s and growing Greek negativism to membership in NATO today. The uneasy relationship between Greece and NATO is one that the Soviet Union will continue to manipulate in an effort to weaken NATO's solidarity in a region they deem necessary to influence freely in their own behalf.

Another circumstance supporting this Soviet effort is the continuing growth of socialism in Greece and in Greek politics. The socialistic beliefs maintained by Greece's political leadership, much like the Yishuv's leadership, encourages closer economic and political ties with the Soviet Union. The Joint Soviet-Greek alumina industrial project in Thessaly, Greece, provides an example of techniques used by the Soviet Union to gain economic influence, the favor of the Greek population, and the allegiance of her political heads. This current economic assistance bears a striking resemblance

⁵Ibid.

to the Soviet aid granted Egypt for construction of the Aswan Dam and to Syria for the Euphrates Dam.

Today the Soviet Union continues to exploit all available resources to increase its regional influence in the Aegean, just as it had done earlier in the Middle East with the Arabs and the Israelis. However, as noted in Chapter Three, present Soviet efforts are not limited solely to Greece. Current Soviet efforts in Cyprus are aimed at one objective: a neutral Cyprus, independent of all foreign troops and foreign military bases. This effort, if successful, would weaken both NATO's and the United States' ability to project military and political power into a region in close proximity to the Soviet Union. If this move by the Soviet Union is not countered by productive peace talks between the two Cypriot communities, the United States and NATO could lose access to key military facilities on Cyprus.

The effort to broaden regional influence is an element of both the United States' and the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Additionally, it is also a similarity that exists between the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and present-day United States relations with both Greece and Turkey. Then as now, the United States had a private agenda motivating its participation in the peace negotiations. This agenda included the goal of protecting and expanding its sphere of influence and also securing

future oil supplies for western countries.⁶ This self-interest is evident in current United States relationships with both Greece and Turkey. The interests of the United States in this case include access to the military and intelligence facilities located in both countries. Just as the sponsorship of Camp David served to protect vital interests then, a similar situation exists today in Greece and Turkey that calls for active involvement by the United States in order to protect its parochial interests in the region. It is incumbent on the United States to become more aggressive in its approach to this situation if it hopes to maintain its influence in both countries.

This situation leads to a review of the final grouping of similarities, those that are classified as part of the peace process and negotiations. The need for peace, the first subdivision of Chapter Four, reveals several important parallels between the Arab-Israeli situation and the Greek-Turkish conflict today. The motivation for peace is the same in both cases. First, "the overwhelming burden of military expenditures in the Middle East [had] a negative impact on their societies and the well-being of their

⁶Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 323-324.

people."⁷ This financial burden overwhelmed the Egyptian economy and placed serious strains on the Israeli economic system. The falling economies in both Egypt and Israel produced pressure on the domestic political scene in each country. As discussed in Chapter Four, President Sadat was under extreme pressure to rectify Egypt's floundering economic picture. This served as a major motivating factor for him to seek a workable peace with Israel despite extremist passions for military satisfaction. Although Israel's situation was not as dire as Egypt's, the Israeli populace wanted to end the hostilities with Egypt.

Based on information from Chapter Two, further study of the above examples indicates a close parallel exists between the Middle East pre-Camp David period and today's Greek-Turkish conflict. The same three factors discussed previously in Chapter Four, national security, territorial claims and economic issues, have brought these two countries to the point where both desire a peaceful resolution to their conflict. The struggling economies of Greece and Turkey would benefit greatly from a peace treaty. Reduced spending on military defenses that are aimed at one another, combined with a growth in trade and commerce between the two countries would enhance both economies appreciably. This would be an

⁷United States Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Middle East at the Crossroads, Report, (9 November 1977), p. 16.

Important victory for both Prime Minister Papandreou and Prime Minister Ozal, at a time when both leaders are suffering strong criticism from their domestic political circles. Prime Minister Ozal's criticism stems from Turkey's deteriorating economic situation, while Prime Minister Papandreou's opposition has grown out of several personally embarrassing events that have weakened his support from the Greek populace and from his PASOK Party. The need for peace is apparent to the leadership of both countries as reflected by the Berne Declaration (Appendix B) and the Joint Communiqué (Appendix C). Both the international and domestic situations of the two countries demand a timely solution to the ongoing conflict.

Having established the need and desire for peace, the study of the peace process and negotiations between Greece and Turkey reveals many similarities and parallels exist with pre-Camp David Egypt and Israel. The first is found at the very beginning of negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Ambassador at Large, Alfred L. Atherton, from the United States Department of State observed:

After so many years of no dialogue, of no trust, of no confidence in each other, they [found] it difficult to plunge directly into the kind of give-and-take negotiations without third-party assistance that would seem quite logical to us.⁸

⁸United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Developments in the Peace Process in the Middle East, Hearing, (28 June 1978), p. 14.

Although he was speaking of the Arab-Israeli dispute, he could as easily have said the same of the current Greek-Turkish conflict as discussed previously in Chapter Two. All countries are aware of the sensitivity that the two nations feel towards the disputed issues. It is with this fragility in mind that the United States could assist in mediating issues, which up to this point have been negotiated bilaterally and have resulted in no meaningful resolutions. It was in this role that the United States proved so successful at Camp David.

In the negotiating process itself, it must be recognized that "[t]he more important the issue in dispute and the more comprehensive the scope of the agreement sought, the more difficult it will be to achieve."⁹ The leadership involved in the Camp David Summit recognized the breadth of the Arab-Israeli conflict and adjusted the Accords to accommodate the situation. This same adjustment must be part of any Greek-Turkish peace plan if it is to overcome the wide range of problems discussed in Chapter Two. Much like Egypt and Israel, today's Greek and Turkish problems are deeply rooted in time and emotions, and may require several separate efforts to find a resolution. Possibly paralleling the limited scope of the Accords, today we see the Cyprus

⁹Touval, p. 330.

issue being negotiated separately from the remaining areas of Greek-Turkish dispute.

Yet another similarity in the negotiating process is the use of joint committees to establish negotiating principles and proposed solutions to unresolved problems. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin established military and political committees to continue their bilateral talks and also to draft a declaration of principles just prior to the Camp David Summit. In today's Greek-Turkish dispute, the two national leaders are also establishing committees to address the same type of issues. In an effort to continue progress in the current bi-national talks, Prime Ministers Papandreou and Ozal have created economic and political committees, both charged with furthering the peace talks in their own respective areas. Only future negotiations will reveal if the Greek and Turkish committees will be as successful as their Egyptian-Israeli counterparts were.

Further study of the negotiating process indicates another similarity, that of United Nations involvement. In both cases the United Nations was intimately involved. It was United Nations Resolution 242 passed following the Arab-Israeli 1967 War that served as the foundation for constructing a workable framework for peace, the Camp David Accords. Resolution 242 not only called for freedom to navigate in international waterways (the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba), but it also called for "achieving a just

settlement of the refugee problem, and guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area."¹⁰ The United Nations provided the basis for the Accords, and it also sponsored numerous calls for cease-fires and peace talks throughout the history of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.

A similar United Nations role exists in today's conflict between Greece and Turkey. Concentrating on the time frame following the coup d'etat in Cyprus in 1974, numerous United Nations' actions have taken place. Cease-fires, intercommunal talks, and other negotiations were sponsored by the United Nations in an effort to achieve peace. Even with this level of involvement however, one major difference does exist between the level of United Nations involvement today and that witnessed during the Arab-Israeli conflict. Greece and Turkey have no United Nations Resolution 242 to focus and structure their mediation and peace efforts. Two resolutions do exist (United Nations Resolutions 3212 and 395), but their scope is limited to individual areas of dispute. Resolution 3212 (1 November 1974) calls for the removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus, and Security Council Resolution 395 (25 August 1976) deals solely with the Aegean continental shelf dispute. Even with this shortfall of no central rallying point, United

¹⁰Malcom H. Kerr, ed., The Elusive Peace in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 69.

Nations mediation efforts continue to play an important role in the Greek-Turkish dispute, which includes sponsoring the current intercommunal talks on Cyprus.

One final area to consider at this point, that contains important similarities, falls under the category of the price of peace. As discussed in Chapter Four:

The Egyptian Government attach[ed] great importance to the willingness of the United States to provide a certain amount of military support, primarily in the form of sales of [military] equipment.¹¹

This willingness by the United States to provide large amounts of military and economic aid to both Egypt and Israel was critical to the success of the Camp David Accords. A similar situation exists today when considering the status of the current DECA negotiations with Greece and Turkey. As discussed in Chapter Three, the United States provides a large percentage of its foreign assistance to Greece and Turkey. Both countries depend heavily on United States military aid to further their force modernization efforts, while lessening the impact of large defense expenditures on their struggling economies. The tense negotiations that led to the signing of the new Turkish DECA agreement in 1988 and that surrounds the current Greek DECA talks are testimony to the importance that Greece and Turkey place on continued

¹¹United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Visit to Eastern Europe and the Middle East by the Senate Delegation to the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Report, (May 1979), p. 25.

substantial United States support. With the trend in DECA negotiations moving towards greater demands on and guarantees from the United States, it is expected that the success of all future peace talks between Greece and Turkey, with United States mediation, to be linked closely with the amount and type of American aid received.

In reviewing the many similarities between pre-Camp David Egypt-Israel and today's Greece-Turkey dispute, it is apparent that the current conflict closely parallels Egypt's and Israel's situation prior to 1978. The Camp David Accords provided the first successful step in a peace process that resolved security, territorial and economic issues. Given the cited similarities in these three categories and coupled with the interest that the United States maintains in the Aegean region, the conclusion is that the Camp David model can successfully be integrated into the current Aegean crisis. Nonetheless, a modern Camp David approach to the Aegean would have to be tailored to the current situation, specifically the security, territorial and economic issues dividing Greece and Turkey. This can be achieved without changing the basic framework and goals of the Camp David approach. To better understand the applicability of the Camp David approach to the Aegean problem, it is important to review past and present mediation efforts in the Greece-Turkey dispute.

ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION

Beginning with the July 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the United Nations has filled the role of primary mediator in the Greek-Turkish conflict. The stationing of the UNFICYP force on Cyprus prior to the invasion was the first of many actions the United Nations has taken to resolve the varied aspects of the conflict. Unfortunately, history shows that these efforts, although successful in some cases, have served poorly in contributing actually to resolving the problems facing Greece and Turkey. The following review of mediation efforts covers the time period from 1974 to present and will provide the reader a picture of just how ineffective the piecemeal efforts have been to date.

Immediately following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, on 26 July 1974, a United Nations cease-fire agreement was signed by both Greece and Turkey. This declaration was subsequently broken by a second invasion on 14 August 1974, initiated by Turkey in response to the breakdown of United Nations' sponsored talks in Geneva. A second United Nations' cease-fire was signed two days later which again led to United Nations' sponsored peace talks. These talks were supported by the issuance of United Nations' Resolution 3212 on 1 November 1974, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Cyprus.¹² The

¹²Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," Adelphi Papers, (Winter 1979/1980), p. 31.

exception to this requirement was the UNFICYP which continued its mission of peacekeeping and remains stationed today along the partition line dividing the Turkish Cypriot north from the Greek Cypriot south. During the years leading up to 1988, little progress was made in the intercommunal talks working towards resolving the Cyprus problem.

After years of United Nations' inaction, the work of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, succeeded in having the two Cypriot leaders meet for the first time in late August 1988. The meeting was preceded by an official visit to the United States by President George Vassiliou, the Greek Cypriot leader. During his eleven day visit, President Vassiliou met with President Ronald Reagan, then Vice President George Bush, and numerous other political representatives to solidify ties with the United States. Following Vassiliou's visit to the United States, President Vassiliou and President Rauf Denktas, the Turkish Cypriot leader, held their meeting in Geneva on 25 August 1988 and agreed to future face-to-face meetings. Their agreed goal was the completion of a negotiated settlement and the implementation of new constitutional amendments calling for a new federal republic by 1 June 1989.

Another common goal was to reach broad level agreements on the disputed issues, leaving the details to be

worked out by "commissions of experts."¹³ This meeting was followed by another meeting between the two presidents with mediation by the United Nation Representative to Cyprus, Oscar Camilleri. The meeting took place in Nicosia, Cyprus, and the results of the two day meeting have not been released to the public. The movement towards resolving the Cyprus issue continues today, but with limited participation by Greece and Turkey.

Current Greek-Turkish negotiations on the Cyprus problem have come to a standstill. Prime Minister "Papandreou has proposed a demilitarization of the island and establishment of a joint Greek-Turkish Cypriot police force under the supervision of the United Nations."¹⁴ On the other hand, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, fearing the United Nations would be unable to protect the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots, stated "that any Turkish troop withdrawal [from Cyprus] would be part of an overall peace settlement,"¹⁵ not aimed solely at Turkish interests and requirements. The nonconverging nature of the Greek and Turkish positions on Cyprus has left their input to the

¹³Country Report: Greece, No.4 (September 26, 1988), p. 19.

¹⁴Joyce M. Davis, "Greek/Turkish Relations and NATO," Journal of Defense & Diplomacy, (January 1989), p. 8.

¹⁵Ibid.

deadlocked situation at a standstill, thereby hampering current United Nations efforts to mediate a settlement there.

Another disputed area in which the United Nations has played a large role is the Aegean continental shelf issue. Chapter Two reviewed the activities that transpired prior to the Cyprus invasion. Following that event several key negotiations took place between Greece and Turkey that provide the foundation for continued talks today. On 27 January 1975 Greece proposed that the continental shelf issue be presented to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for a legal decision. Turkey initially agreed to the Greek proposal for ICJ arbitration on 6 February 1975. Although the Turkish government later changed its mind and reversed its stance on the ICJ adjudication, the case went forward to the ICJ for resolution.¹⁶

Greece drafted two proposals and submitted them to the ICJ for consideration. The first proposal called for placing an injunction on Turkey in an effort to keep the disputed areas of the Aegean shelf open to Greek use. The second proposal called for proceedings against Turkey for its illegal delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. This proposal, coupled with Turkey's change in attitude towards ICJ mediation, caused a break in the continental shelf talks.

¹⁶Jonathan Alford, ed., Greece and Turkey: Adversity In Alliance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 122.

On 25 August 1976, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 395. Paragraph three of the resolution

called on the governments of Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their differences and appealed to them to do everything in their power to ensure that these resulted in mutually acceptable solutions.¹⁷

The resolution also recommended that the dispute be handled by the ICJ. On 12 September 1976, the ICJ denied Greece's request for an interim injunction against Turkey. The United Nations immediately recommended a resumption of bilateral talks, a recommendation that led to a November 1976 meeting in Berne, Switzerland.

After two weeks of talks on the continental shelf issue, experts from both countries signed the Berne Declaration (see Appendix B). This "declaration establish[ed] a code of behavior to govern future negotiations on the continental shelf."¹⁸ This became important on 19 December 1978, when the ICJ passed a decision not to arbitrate the continental shelf issue because it considered the issue a domestic matter. The decision was quickly followed by an ICJ announcement in January 1978 that the continental shelf dispute was not under its jurisdiction and, therefore, it lacked the authority to hear the case. Because of the ICJ decision, the Berne Declaration "remains

¹⁷Wilson, p. 9.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 10.

the recognized framework for bilateral discussions¹⁹ on the continental shelf issue. As mentioned in the introduction of Chapter One, the most recent major Greek-Turkish conflict, the March 1987 Aegean oil exploration crisis, came about because both countries were determined to test the limits of the Berne Declaration. This situation narrowly avoided an outbreak of armed hostilities by both countries. The emotional impact of this crisis pushed both countries into the comprehensive negotiations that are going on today.

In January 1988, the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey met in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss the ongoing dispute between the two NATO allies. This two day meeting created a feeling of mutual good will and resulted in the publication of a Joint Communiqué (see Appendix C) by the two Prime Ministers on 31 January 1988. In short, the communiqué called for peaceful relations between the allies, annual meetings of the two prime ministers, and for the establishment of two committees to assist in finding solutions to the conflict. One joint committee was to specialize in economic and cultural issues while the second committee was to address the bilateral problem areas.

During the last week in May 1988, Greek Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias and Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz met in Athens. Accompanied by their

¹⁹Ibid., p. 11.

representative country teams, the foreign ministers collectively formed a new Joint Political Committee whose mission was to pave the way for an upcoming meeting between the two prime ministers, scheduled for June 1988. The result of this meeting was the publication of a Memorandum of Understanding (see Appendix D) on 27 May 1988. Although the memorandum focused solely on military activities in the Aegean (both the high seas and air traffic), it established a positive climate for the upcoming June negotiations in Athens.

The second meeting between Prime Minister Papandreou and Prime Minister Ozal took place in June 1988 in Athens. This meeting, referred to as the Athens Summit, marked the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to Greece in 36 years.²⁰ Although both the Cyprus issue and the Aegean problems were discussed, no formal agreements were reached except to continue the dialogue with the scheduling of another prime ministerial level meeting in the Autumn of 1988. At the Summit's conclusion, Prime Minister Ozal commented:

We have agreed with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to put an end to this rather odd state of affairs between two neighboring countries, and to place our relations on a sound basis and seek solutions to all our bilateral issues through dialogue.²¹

²⁰Country Report: Turkey, No.3 (June 29, 1988), p. 7.

²¹Davis, "Greek/Turkish Relations and NATO," p. 7.

While the Athens Summit was taking place, other talks proceeded simultaneously in both Ankara and Athens between the foreign and economic ministries of their two countries. Greek National Economy Minister Panayotis Roumeliotis and Turkish State Minister Adnan Kahveci met as the Joint Economics Committee in Ankara and came to several key economic and cultural agreements. Areas in which agreements were made included co-operation on economic, industrial, technological, and scientific endeavors. Other areas addressed during these talks included railroad improvements, telecommunication modernization and improvements in investment opportunities. The latter discussions specifically focused on addressing the feasibility of establishing a Joint Investment bank for Greece and Turkey.²² Future meetings will address the issues of tourism, transportation and joint business ventures.

The foreign minister talks were held simultaneously in Athens and no agreements were reached. These meetings covered a diverse agenda including terrorism, drug smuggling, taxation and maritime issues. The June 1988 meetings adjourned expecting to reconvene again late in 1988.

Although Prime Minister Papandreou was scheduled to travel to Turkey for the next summit in November 1988, he postponed his trip, presumably because of the upcoming June

²²Country Report: Greece, No.4 (September 26, 1988), p. 11.

1989 Greek elections. His postponement called for another meeting sometime in the new year 1989. Prime Minister Ozal has since recommended that Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's visit be delayed until after the June Greek elections. While the primary heads of state are politically unprepared to negotiate at this time, the ministerial level negotiations continue between the joint economic and political committees. In the final analysis, the interruption created by the two prime ministers has slowed rapprochement efforts.

In summary, the mediation efforts led primarily by the United Nations have met with limited success to date. At the same time, direct bilateral negotiations, when viewed over the period 1974 to present, have also met with minimal success in terms of providing a comprehensive settlement. Turning the focus now, this study answers the question, "Who should/can lead the peace process?"

UNITED STATES LED PEACE

The previous section reviewed the roles of both the United Nations and the ICJ in the Greek-Turkish dispute. As summarized, both agencies have been unable to resolve the comprehensive spectrum of problems dividing Greece and Turkey today. In Chapter Three discussion was presented that indicates NATO too has been ineffective in resolving the issues that separate the two allies. Although the 1979 Rogers Plan achieved a partial resolution to the NATO command

and control issue, no substantial progress was made in solving the cause of the conflict.

The failure experienced by these three mediators, coupled with the ineffective bilateral negotiations that have transpired thus far, leaves little doubt that a strong United States effort is required to solve the conflict. Just as the Arab-Israeli situation demanded strong United States involvement, so does today's Greek-Turkish conflict. The United States cannot afford to be an idle bystander in this dispute. A review of Chapter Three is a reminder of the vital geographical and military roles these two countries play in supporting NATO and the United States. More than any other single agency or nation, the United States as a third party to this dispute has a greater interest in its ultimate outcome.

The need for the United States to fill the mediator role in this situation can be concluded by reviewing the implications of both successful and unsuccessful United States-led peace talks. The area that would be influenced most in either case is the NATO Alliance. With a successful United States' effort, NATO's southern flank would be strengthened. The crisis described in Chapter Three would end. Two benefits of a treaty would include continued United States access to military and intelligence facilities in Greece and Turkey and a further displacement of Soviet efforts to gain influence in the region. On the other hand,

If the United States' efforts proved unsuccessful, NATO's southern flank would not simply remain in its weakened condition, but would decline as Greek-Turkish relations continued to worsen. This situation would benefit current Soviet efforts to weaken NATO and would more than likely result in increased Soviet efforts to develop and improve relations with Greece. Both NATO and the United States would suffer from any deterioration in security provided by Greece and Turkey in the south. Any such loss would impact directly on military readiness and force projection capabilities in the region by the United States and NATO. In either case, the United States should expect Greece and Turkey to continue their demands for greater levels of United States military assistance while giving less and less in return for such aid.

The impact of successful negotiations on Joint United States and Greek-Turkish relations would also be significant. The cooling of United States-Greek relations over the last decade would improve measurably if the United States led negotiations were successful. It would also mark a continuation in strong, healthy United States-Turkish relations. Success would also result in economic benefits for all three countries, in addition to the rebirth of strong ties between the allies. If, however, the United States effort proved unsuccessful, relations between all three parties would cool. This breakdown could possibly result in an increased growth of socialism in Greece and of Moslem

fundamentalist elements in Turkey, both of which espouse anti-American and anti-democratic themes. In conclusion, there is a danger that some situations might deteriorate if the United States effort were to fail.

The final implications of a successful United States effort would fall under the category of cost. With Greece and Turkey already accounting for two of the United States' top five military assistance recipients, the success of a United States led peace effort would have little effect on this status. The United States would continue to grant military and economic aid but at possibly higher levels. This might be considered paying short term costs that produce long term gains. On the other hand, if the United States' effort failed, the short and long term costs to America would be overwhelming. The possible loss of access to Greek facilities would force the United States to relocate those activities and to expend further monies and efforts to bolster Turkey's military in an effort to partially stabilize the southern flank. The overall economic cost, particularly to Greece in lost aid and the United States in lost facilities, would create a long term negative impact on all three countries.

A review of the implications of a successful/unsuccessful United States mediation effort, makes it apparent that the United States, utilizing the Camp David approach, with itself as the interested third party mediator,

could resolve the areas of dispute facing Greece and Turkey (i.e., Cyprus, Aegean oil/mineral exploration, territorial limits, air space control, and militarization of islands). As Chapter Three pointed out, while the United States maintains a variety of means to influence the dispute,

We must also recognize that security assistance is our most potent instrument. Security assistance is not to be viewed as the indiscriminate sale and transfer of arms to others but, rather, as assisting our friends or allies in providing the internal security essential to the growth of democratic institutions.²³

As the Camp David Accords demonstrated, security assistance is critical to both the success of negotiations as well as to the maintenance of strong United States alliances.

The ability to manipulate United States military aid to Greece and Turkey, coupled with the inauguration of President George Bush in January 1989, provides the environment and timing necessary to conduct new negotiations using the Camp David approach. President Bush has introduced new direction into United States involvement in international politics and may provide the leadership needed to create a Camp David approach to solve the Greece-Turkey conflict.

In the final analysis there is no means to prove whether United States interests will or will not be served if

²³United States Department of Defense, "Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget," Annual Report to the Congress, (February 1988), p. 61.

the United States takes the lead in mediating a lasting peace between Greece and Turkey. Unlike the physical sciences governed by theories of absolutes and certainties, political and military sciences are subject to great variability.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this study has analyzed the current Greece-Turkey dispute in detail and compared it to the situation that existed between Egypt and Israel during the time leading up to the 1978 signing of the Camp David Peace Accords. It is important to keep in mind that the Camp David Accords were only the first step towards a comprehensive peace and that the negotiating "process" that led to their signing formed an integral part of the Accords. Numerous military, political and economic parallels have been drawn between the two situations in an effort to determine if the Camp David Accords and the Camp David process could be adapted successfully to the Greece-Turkey conflict.

My review of the current mediation efforts and political leadership dispositions earlier in the chapter, coupled with my analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict and the Camp David Accords, leads to the conclusion that the Camp David framework can be modified by the United States to bring a lasting peace to Greece and Turkey. It is extremely doubtful that any kind of peace treaty will result from the current bilateral peace efforts, currently on hold until

after the June 1989 Greek elections. The summer of 1989 will present a rare opportunity for the United States and President Bush to step in and resolve a situation that increasingly threatens United States and NATO interests. An effort similar to the Camp David Accords, with a United States guarantee much like that granted to the Egyptians and Israelis, would defuse growing Greek socialism and Turkish Moslem fundamentalist elements. Although both Prime Minister Papandreou and Prime Minister Ozal have recently suffered domestic political setbacks, their invaluable experience could still be utilized by President Bush in reaching a workable peace treaty. Furthermore, a victory of such magnitude would place both leaders "back on top," much as the signing of the Camp David Accords did for President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.

APPENDIX A

Camp David Accords
(17 September 1978)

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the people of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolution 242 and 338.

Peace requires respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within

secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agreed are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is extended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of the framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of

self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transition period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank

and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat of the use of force to settle disputes. Any dispute shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relations normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- (a) full recognition;
- (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:
For the Government of Israel:
Witnessed by:

Al-Sadat
M. Begin
Jimmy Carter, President of the
United States of America

FRAMEWORK FOR AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage of ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be opened to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter, President of the
United States of America

(Source: Tarr, David R., and Bryan R. Daves, ed. The Middle East, Sixth Edition. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986, pp. 292-294.)

APPENDIX B

The Berne Declaration

(11 November 1976)

On the procedure to be followed for the delimitation of the continental shelf by Greece and Turkey.

1. Both parties agree that negotiations be sincere, detailed and conducted in good faith with a view to reaching an agreement based on the mutual consent regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf

2. Both parties agree that these negotiations should, due to their nature, be strictly confidential.

3. Both parties reserve their respective positions regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf.

4. Both parties undertake the obligation not to use the details of this agreement and the proposals that each will make during the negotiations in any circumstance outside the context of the negotiations.

5. Both parties agree no statements or leaks to the press should be made referring to the content of the negotiations unless they commonly agree to do so.

6. Both parties undertake to abstain from any initiative or act relating to the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea which might prejudice the negotiations.

7. Both parties undertake, as far as their bilateral relations are concerned, to abstain from any initiative or act which would tend to discredit the other party.

8. Both parties have agreed to study state practice and international rules on this subject with a view to educing certain principles and practical criteria which could be of use in the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.

9. A mixed commission will be set up to this end and will be composed of national representatives.

10. Both parties agree to adopt a gradual approach in the course of the negotiations ahead after consulting each other.

(Source: "The Aegean Dispute, "Wilson, Andrew. Adelphi: Papers. No. 155. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1979/80, p. 30.)

APPENDIX C

Text of Joint Communiqué
(31 January 1988)

1. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey met twice in Davos, Switzerland, on January 30-31, 1988, and discussed issues of mutual concern in an atmosphere of understanding and good will.
2. The Prime Ministers observed that accumulated problems created owing to different approaches are, at times, exploited by certain circles. It is imperative that closing the gap between these differences will require time, good will and hard work.
3. The Prime Ministers gave their views of Greek-Turkish relations, starting from a historic perspective and their deterioration in time. They further elaborated on the recent crisis in the Aegean which brought the two countries to the brink of war and expressed at the same time their optimism introduced as a consequence of an exchange of messages between them. They agreed that from now on such a crisis should never be repeated and both sides must concentrate their efforts for the establishment of lasting peaceful relations.
4. The Prime Ministers agreed that rigid frames of mind have been created in various segments of their societies in relation to existing issues. They noted that this is the case even in textbooks. They noted also with regret some recent statements of officials not conducive to an improvement of relations between the two countries.
5. The two Prime Ministers reiterated their respective positions on issues of bilateral and regional interest.
6. They nevertheless underlined that a thaw between the two countries would require determination, sustained efforts and building of confidence for which the two sides should move to a common ground, in order to create an environment conducive to working out lasting solutions.
7. The Prime Ministers agreed to establish two committees: one to explore the areas of co-operation, joint ventures, trade, tourism, communications, cultural exchanges, and one to define the problem areas, explore the possibilities of closing the gap and move towards lasting solutions, the progress of which will be reviewed by the two Prime Ministers. In this regard, they agreed to initiate, encourage and increase contacts among civilian and military officials, members of the Press and businessmen and to establish a Business Council or a Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

8. The Prime Ministers also agreed to meet at least once a year and to make reciprocal visits to their countries and agreed to set up a direct telephone line. They also agreed that the ambassadors of the two countries to international organizations should increase contacts with a view to improving co-operation.

9. Finally, both Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the frank and open discussions which took place between themselves and reiterated their conviction that creation of improved relations and confidence would require resolve, time and hard work.

(Source: Athena, January/February 1988, p. 13.)

APPENDIX D

Memorandum of Understanding
(27 May 1988)

The two parties have agreed on the following confidence building measures:

1. Both parties recognise the obligation to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the high seas and international airspace of the Aegean.

2. In conducting national military activities in the high seas and the international airspace, the two parties shall endeavor to avoid interfering with smooth shipping and air-traffic as ensured in accordance with international instruments, rules and regulations. This would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources of tension and reduce the risks of collision.

3. The two parties have agreed that the planning and the conduct of national military exercises in the high seas and the international airspace which require the promulgation of a NOTAM or any other notification or warning should be carried out in such a way as to avoid also to the maximum extent possible the following:

- a) The isolation of certain areas.
- b) The blocking of exercise areas for long periods of time.
- c) Conduct during the tourist peak period (1 July - 1 September)* and main national and religious holidays.

It is understood that the planning and execution of all national military activities will be carried out in accordance with the existing international rules, regulations and procedures.

4. With a view to achieving the above, and without prejudice to the existing international regulations and procedures, the two sides will proceed, when required, to due communication through diplomatic channels.

5. The provisions of this memorandum of understanding shall have effect and be implemented in full conformity with the provisions of the Davos Joint Press Communiqué.

ATHENS, 27 MAY 1988

Signed by:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Hellenic Republic
Carolos Papoulias

The Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Turkey
Mesut Yilmaz

* For 1988, 7 July - 1 September.

(Source: Athena, May 1988, p. 85.)

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